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Risky Business: Popular Images and Reality
of Capital Markets Handling Risk-From
the Tulip Craze to the Decade of Greed
Christian C. Day*
Speculators are often portrayed in popular culture as predatory
businesspeople. Sometimes they are seen as fools. But, the portraits
are often ill-informed. This article studies speculationfound in Tulip
Mania and the South Sea Bubble. The article then focuses on
speculation in debt from the American Revolution. The Gilded Age
and railroadbuilding are surveyed. The article concludes with the
Decade of Greed, the 1980s, as envisioned in film. While popular
portraits are entertaining, the historic and economic reality is much
different. Speculatorsplay an important role providing capital and
liquidity, risk taking, and rationing of resources criticalfor market
economies.
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INTRODUCTION

Speculators are often portrayed in literature, film and the media as
evil businessmen who prey upon markets. Or they are portrayed as fools,
who part with their money. The popular portraits accepted by the
culture, while colorful, are ill-informed.1
This article looks at the view held of speculators in early market
bubbles such as Tulip Mania (1634-1637) and the South Sea Bubble
(1720).2 It then moves to the 1780s and early 1790s in the United States
and looks at the broadsides fired by supporters of Jefferson and Madison
Next, the Gilded Age
at speculators in Revolutionary War debt.

exemplified by Jim Fisk (the great drummer and war profiteer), Daniel
1. George Will's recent synopsis of Tulip Mania is the standard refrain:
Tulip mania gripped Holland in the 1630s. Prices soared, speculation raged,
bulbs promising especially exotic or intense colors became the objects of such
frenzied bidding that some changed hands 10 times a day. Then, suddenly, the
spell was broken, the market crashed-prices plummeted in some cases to onehundredth of what they had been just days before. And when Reason was
restored to her throne, no one could explain what all the excitement was about.
George F. Will, The Last Word: Of Tulips and Fred Thompson, NEWSWEEK, June 18,
2007, at 82. Pundits provide similar misinformation about the South Sea and Mississippi
Company Bubbles, the Gilded Age, and the 1980s (the Decade of Greed). Mysteriously,
the Jeffersonian screed against the speculation in Continentals has dropped from the
pulpits. But its view of arbitrageurs remains soundly etched in the psyche of the general
public and those who should know better.
2. For an exceptional article on market speculation, regulation and gambling, see
Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, With a Tulip, in the South Seas: Gambling and
Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions,26 J. CoRP. L. 225 (2001).
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Drew (the Speculative Director), Jay Gould (the Dark Genius of Wall
Street), and Commodore Vanderbilt ("the public be damned") is
surveyed. The article concludes its survey with the Decade of Greed, the
1980s, as seen through "Other People's Money" and "Wall Street."
While the portraits of these culprits are vivid, and the fulminations
and exhortations against speculation are entertaining, the historic and
economic reality is much different. Speculators provide an important
and discrete function. They provide capital and liquidity, risk taking, and
rationing of resources vital for all market economies.

II.

TULIP MANIA: THE DUTCH WERE NOT MAD!

The Netherlands: The World's First Modern Economy. 3 From
approximately the mid-sixteenth century until the end of the seventeenth
century, the Netherlands was the strongest and most innovative economy
in the West. 4 During this period the Netherlands underwent a financial
revolution creating the first modem financial system. The Dutch
financial system contained all the requirements for modernity. 5 It had an
efficiently-managed public finance and debt system. Holland enjoyed
sound money.6 It possessed a banking system and a central bank. The
Netherlands had a securities market' and it had corporations, such as the
Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (the VOC or Dutch East India
Company), the West India Company (WIC), and the Bank of
Amsterdam. 8
Dutch wealth and economic power were founded upon shipping,
trade and the related financial institutions that developed to
3. Much of the following section on Tulip Mania is based upon Christian C. Day, Is
There a Tulip in Your Future?: Ruminations on Tulip Mania and the Innovative Dutch
FuturesMarket, 14 JOURNAL DES ECONOMISTES ET DES ETUDES HUMAINES (A BILINGUAL
JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES) 151 (2004).
4. See JAN DE VRIES & AD VAN DER WOUDE, THE FIRST MODERN ECONOMY:
SUCCESS, FAILURE, AND PERSEVERANCE OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY, 1500-1815 (Cambridge

University Press 1997) [hereinafter FIRST MODERN ECONOMY].
5. See Richard Sylla talk at Conference on Early Securities Markets, Humboldt
University, Berlin, Germany, October 15-16, 2004 (notes on file with author).
6.

See FIRST MODERN ECONOMY, note 4, at 131-34.

7. Shares in the VOC were first traded on the Amsterdam bourse in 1611.

See

JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A
REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 20 (Modem Library 2003).
8. While the VOC and the WIC were technically not corporations, they operated as
limited partnerships. Their risk-sharing structure and limited liability enabled these
enterprises to undertake important economic activities. The corporate form meant
businesses were capable of both more efficient borrowing and deployment of capital.
The innovative financial structure and operations of the Dutch East India Company are
described in Ron Harris, The Formation of the East India Company as a Deal between
Entrepreneurs and Outside Investors (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=567941.
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accommodate the Netherlands' position as an entrep6t for Europe. By
the 1550s the Dutch had employed futures in grain (before the harvest)
and herring (before the fish were caught). 9 Money made in futures was
described in the following manner:
And this bargaining is most proper for such and the like commodities,
the price whereof doth quickly rise and fall, and are also commodious
when mans money is not so ready to buy much, and to make a great
employment with little money, which happeneth upon some sudden
advice many times unexpected, whereupon men are very hot either to
buy or sell: which is much used in Flanders in buying of Herring,
before they are catched, by "stellegelt," as they call it, that is by a
summe of money agreed upon to be paid, if the partie doeth repent
himselfe of the bargaine .... 10
By the seventeenth century futures were traded in such goods as pepper,
coffee, cacao, saltpeter, whale oil and whalebone." I In 1609, "futures
trading" emerged for shares in the Dutch East India Company where a
disgruntled former owner tried to organize "bears" to drive down the
price."
Tulip Mania and the Innovative Futures Market. Tulip Mania
(1634-1637) is constantly offered as an example of a market truly gone
manic.1 3 Every time there is a bubble the whipping boys of Tulip Mania
and the South Sea Bubble are trotted out by pundits who should know
better. Investors in tulip bulbs are often seen as rubes that lost fortunes
and destroyed the Dutch economy over wild speculation in tulip bulbs.
Critics of Tulpenwoerde (tulip madness) claim family fortunes were lost
for a single bulb. For some, it serves as a perfect model of speculative
frenzies.14 Indeed, many commentators unwittingly report that the frenzy

9.
10.

FIRST MODERN ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 150.
VIOLET BARBOUR, CAPITALISM IN AMSTERDAM IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 74

(Johns Hopkins Press 1950), citing Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria 144 (2d. ed,
London, 1686).
11. FIRST MODERN ECONOMY, supra note 4, at 150.
12. Id. at 151. "Bears" are speculators trying to drive prices down to make a profit.
A bear goes short. He borrows against the stock at a certain price and promises to replace
the stock within a period of time. If the stock is overpriced, the bear replaces the
borrowed stock with the cheaper-priced shares, thereby making a profit.
13. See, e.g., Will, supra note 1.
14. In conventional usage, a bubble is a rise in the price of an asset that feeds on
itself but is unrelated to any fundamental change in the value of the asset. Thus, an
increase in the price causes further increase in price. At some point, asset holders
become persuaded that the increases cannot possibly continue and begin selling, which
causes others to sell even faster now that they are persuaded the bubble has burst. See
Phillip Caruso & Virginia Paganelli Caruso, Book Reviews: Great Bubbles, 31 Bus.
ECON., No. 1, 67 (2002).
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produced a collapse of the economy from which it took the Dutch years
to recover.1 5 The truth is quite different.
The high prices that rare tulips commanded in Tulip Mania-and
the source of madness of the crowds in morality tales-is a common
aspect of markets for newly developed varieties of prized goods.
A standard pricing pattern arises for new varieties of flowers, even in
modem markets. When a particularly prized variety is developed, its
original bulb sells for a high price. As bulbs accumulate, the
after less than 30 years, the bulbs sell at
variety's price falls rapidly;
16
their reproduction cost.
17
Even today, rare bulbs can command high prices.
Little economic dislocation resulted from tulip speculation.' 8 The
surviving morality tales' 9 stem from the Dutch government's campaign
against such speculation. The speculation in common bulbs that occurred
in 1637 was aberrant. It lasted one month, occurring in the midst of an
outbreak of bubonic plague. It had no lasting effects.20
The Fascinating Tulip and Northwest Europe's Fascination
with It. The word tulip is probably derived from the Turkish tulipan, or
turban.2 1 By the mid-sixteenth century, travelers to Turkey were
fascinated with the flower and imported it to Vienna. The flower
attracted notice and was soon grown in Belgium, Holland and Germany.
15. The truth is vastly different. The Dutch were "a great power inside and outside
Europe for almost a century." PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 To 2000,67 (Random

House 1987). During the economic "devastation" that followed the tulip bubble collapse,
the Dutch continued to field an army of 100,000 men and rostered large fleets (on a
population base of 1.5 million). See PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE
FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS 20 (MIT Press 2000) [hereinafter FAMOUS FIRST

BUBBLES]. This is no mean feat for an economy allegedly on its back because of the tulip
bubble. The continued prosperity, the vibrancy of its capital markets, and Holland's
continued international importance belie any substantial effect of the speculation.
16.

Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 35, 38 (1990)

[hereinafter Garber- 1990].
17. Even though tulips have dropped from fashion, new bulbs can be quite
expensive. "Information provided by officials at Bloembollencentrum in Haarlem
indicates, however, that new varieties of 'very special' tulip bulbs currently sell for about
5,000 guilders ($2,400 at 1987 exchange rates) per kilogram. A small quantity of
prototype lily bulbs recently sold for I million guilders ($480,000 at 1987 exchange
rates)." Peter M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535, 555 (1989) [hereinafter
Garber- 1989].
18.

See FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 23.

19. See infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
20. Save for the plethora of misinformation about its "devastating" bubble that
continues to this day.
21. See EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF
FINANCIAL SPECULATION (Farrar Straus Giroux 1999) [hereinafter DEVIL TAKE THE
HINDMOST].
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The tulip was new and valuable as the rising middle class 22 and
aristocracy decorated their ladies with exotic flowers, including tulips.
Cultivated tulips sometimes produce "striking mutations" caused by
a virus. These mutations produce extraordinarily beautiful and rare
flowers.
[T]he flower itself had a unique trick which added dangerously to its
other attracts. It could change colour, seemingly at will. A plaincoloured flower such as Councillor Herwart's red tulip, might emerge
the following spring in a completely different guise, the petals
feathered and flamed in intricate patterns of white and deep red.
Seventeenth-century tulip lovers could not know that these 'breaks'
were caused by a virus which was spread by aphids for the research
that provided the answer to a mystery that had intrigued and ensnared
23
tulip growers for centuries was only carried out in the late 1920s.
Growers would seek such mutations, called "breaks." The new
bloom, rectified, would be in great demand. The rarest specimens could
command great prices.
The virus was the joker in the tulip bed. Since its cause was for so
long not known, its effects could not be controlled. Fortunately, once
a bulb had broken, it remained broken and the offsets produced by
the bulb carried the same characteristics. But the virus had the effect
of weakening the tulip, so offsets were not produced so freely and
vigorously as might be the case with a virus-free bulb. Consequently,
fine broken varieties such as 'Semper Augustus'
were slow to
2
increase and that in turn increased their value. W
Tulips Futures Develop.

By the 1620s the tulip had become the

25

flower of fashion. A futures market for tulips gradually emerged for
professional horticulturists and speculators.2 6 Buying in the winter for
future delivery came into practice around 1634, that is, contracts for
future delivery were made during the fall and winter. Like present day
futures markets, these options, or futures, only required a small
percentage of the purchase price for the option. However, as will be
seen, there were substantial and consequential differences between the
tulips futures market and modem day futures markets.
22.

See ANNA PAVORD, THE TULIP 6

(Bloomsbury 2004) (1999) [hereinafter THE

TULIP].

23.
24.

Id. at 7-9; see also FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 39-42.
THE TULIP, supra note 22, at 9.

25.

See id at 137-45.

26. Other parties were often involved. "Shortage of available land was a constant
problem for growers. Contracts drawn up between buyers and sellers at the height of
Dutch tulipmania show that bulbs were often grown on plots belonging to a third party,
who doubtless took a cut from the proceeds of any sale." Id. at 151.
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The tulip market extended to the "future" sale for full bulbs.
Horticulturists and speculators alike sought bulbs that contained the
mosaic virus that produced fantastic "breaks." The high price for tulips
was for particularly beautiful broken bulbs. Single colored breeder
bulbs, except for their potential as "breaks," were not highly valued.
Breaking was unpredictable and growers' pursuit of breaking bulbs could
be characterized as a calculated gamble.27
As tulips became more popular, futures markets developed for rare
tulips, with considerable speculation, and modest future markets for
common tulips. The Dutch were shrewd business people-they grew
their tulip market fast, but not too fast. This method both popularized the
wonderful flower and maintained high demand. Very early, the Dutch
commodified the tulip trade by selling bulbs by weight. The standard of
measure was the azen. Twenty-one azen equaled one gram. "The weight
was important, for the larger the bulb, the more likely to flower and to
produce the precious offset, the daughter bulb., 28 "Once the concept of
the azen had taken hold, these azens could be traded on their own
account, without the bulbs actually changing hands at all. The azens
took on a 'futures' life of their own and the tulip itself. . . 'became an
abstraction, a name, a symbol interchangeable with a certain amount of
money.", 29 Demand for rare and common bulbs peaked in late winter,
just before the delivery of the bulbs.3 °
Premiums for extremely rare breaks did not last long.
Horticulturists bred them to reap profits. This breeding spread the
variety and made it more accessible and common. Some of the rare
tulips mutated rapidly into a more common form, reducing the value of
those bulbs but also heightening the speculation for rare and productive
bulbs. New rare varieties depressed the prices for older varieties. As the
prices dropped, tulip production spread.3 1
27. Because the cause of the "breaks" was not discovered until the late 1920s,
horticulturists, growers and florists were required to speculate on which bulbs would
"break." Thus, these futures were somewhat riskier than futures in herring or grain. The
issue with herring and grain was quantity and quality, determined by weather, and
sometimes, naval interdiction by rival commercial powers. With tulips it was different
because as talented as the Dutch growers and horticulturists were, they lacked scientific
precision in determining which bulbs would produce the critical "daughters" and what
splendor those "daughters" would take. See id. at 7-9.
28. Id. at7n.1.
29. Id. at 7, citing ZBIGNIEW HERBERT, STILL LIFE WITH A BRIDLE (1991).
30. This peak in demand is to be expected in an agricultural market. Prices typically
peak when the commodity is in short supply and its quality is unknown.
31. This expansion in production would seem to lower the cost of production and
returns to investors. However, the Dutch were careful in husbanding the growth of their
luxury goods by seeking spectacular varieties for the wealthy. The growers also
increased the production of common tulips production to sell to the rising middle class.
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The successful development of the Dutch economy in the
seventeenth century required striking a balance between "safe"
investments and "speculations" or "unsafe" investments. The oligarchy
and magistrates recognized that some speculations needed to be tolerated
because growth depended on undertaking new and risky ventures. Safe
investments were activities with extensive public regulation like marine
insurance, the Wisselbank (a note-issuing bank) and Baltic trade, which
the Dutch monopolized.3 z
Riskier, but critical activities, included investment in the Dutch East
India Company and the West India Company. 33 Risky and suspect
investments included "windhandel" or "trading in the wind" (trading
shares investors do not possess-think
stock options). Such investments
34
were banned by an edict in 1610.
The tulip futures market lacked some of the features of modem
futures markets. Sales for future delivery were permitted for those
investors who actually owned shares. We can see that futures for bulbs
would violate the edict of 1610 because most of the speculators would
not own the bulbs they were trading. 35 While futures for hedging were
permitted, the authorities decried future trading as immoral gambling and
edicts precluded civil enforcement of these contracts.3 6 An edict banning
risky investments was extended when the war with Spain renewed in
1630, and again in 1636. 37
Futures traders were not prosecuted. However, legal enforcement
of the contracts was refused. The process-"an appeal to Frederick" (or
to the Prince)-permitted the buyer of a futures contract to renege with
the backing of the courts. Nevertheless, future trading and selling short
were tolerated and thrived with private enforcement. Repudiation might
result in the trader being excluded from the bourse. Reputation and the
desire for profits from future trading persuaded most traders to honor
their contracts. Only when traders faced bankruptcy did they choose to
dishonor the contracts. 38
32.

See

33.
34.

See id. at 33-34.
See id. at 34.

FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15,

at 33.

35. Many of the tavern-formed tulip contracts were "naked options." Naked options
are the riskiest form of options because the writer of the option must go into the market to
procure the shares or commodity to fulfill the contract. In a rising market, writers of
"puts" will be squeezed as they scamper to cover the contract at settlement. For more on
options, see ROBERT W. HAMILTON, MONEY MANAGEMENT FOR LAWYERS AND CLIENTS:
ESSENTIAL CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 438-42 (Little, Brown & Co. 1993).
36. See FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 34.
37. See id.

38. See id. at 34-35. A number of the non-professionals who entered the game may
have lost money or even gone bankrupt because they borrowed money to enter the market
initially or during their trades. Under these circumstances, the debt would still be due
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Thus, while futures trading in tulips and other commodities was
frowned upon by the magistrates and authorities, it thrived. Even though
such trading was banned by the edicts and unenforceable in the courts,
by the mid-1630s the Dutch had created a developed and sophisticated
futures market for tulips. It was soundly financed and relied principally
upon moral suasion and reputation for enforcement.
The Tulip Mania. By 1634 the market for tulip bulbs included
both professional florists and growers as well as speculators. During the
next two years an informal futures market had also developed. Amid an
outbreak of Bubonic Plague in the summer of 1636, traders met in
groups called "colleges" in taverns. Buyers were required to pay 1/20
guilder per contract with a maximum of 3 guilders for each deal, or
"wine money," a modest amount.39 Margins were not required for either
party. 40 Typical buyers did not possess the cash until closing. Sellers did
not possess the bulbs. Neither party expected delivery on settlement.
Payment of the amount between the contract price and settlement price
was required. 4 1 Contracts were not re-priced according to market
fluctuations, there were no margin requirements to prompt compliance,
and commitments were to individuals rather than an exchange. In
modem practice:
even though the contract they were funding was unenforceable. These speculators were
still liable for the funds advanced, but not legally liable to close on the future contract!
39. See id. at 44. For a description of the trading in the tavern groups called
colleges, see id. at 44-45. Schama also describes the tavern trading:
There were three methods of buying, the simplest through Dutch auction,
at which the seller began with a high price and reduced it until a bid was
offered. The more common method of dealing, though, was either
"through the plates" or "through the nought." In the former, wooden discs
with value units inscribed on them were circulated, those receiving them
having to make a bid. Sellers were forbidden to offer their own goods
directly but to intimate in some strangely roundabout way [that] they
would sell for a price that had been offered. When some sort of
convergence was noted, the two parties and proxies haggled together
privately, marking their agreed price with chalk marks on the discs. If the
deal went through, the marks remained; if not, they were wiped off by one
party or the other. Whoever withdrew paid a small fee to the other as
compensation. "In the nought" had the seller draw a design on a slate and
place a sum of money in it to act as a premium incentive to whoever
bidded highest at auction.
SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES: AN INTERPRETATION OF DUTCH
CULTURE IN THE GOLDEN AGE 359-60 (Knopf 1987) [hereinafter EMBARRASSMENT OF
RICHES].
40. See FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 45 (stating that the margin

requirement protects the futures market by ensuring that the players are capable of
settling on the contracts. A defect of the tulip market was the lack of such a requirement.
Hence, unschooled, amateurs freely entered and distorted the market during the height of
Tulip Mania because they had so little at risk.).
41. Seeid.at44-45.
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[T]he futures exchange has a clearing association that serves [as]
guarantor of all futures contracts and reduces the default risk
significantly.... At the end of every business day the futures'
clearing association interposes itself between the two parties to a
futures contract, assuming the opposite side of each transaction. The
clearing 42association also serves as a guarantor of every futures
contract.

These protections were absent from the Dutch tulip market and this
undoubtedly contributed to that market's turbulence.
Settlement price was "determined by that at which most bargains
were made," undoubtedly at the expiration date of the contract (which is
the modem practice).43 In the event of a market collapse gross rather
than net positions would have to be unraveled.44 We can readily see that
the primitive character of the legal and accounting conventions would
make any collapse a mess to correct.
Professor Peter Garber speculates that an exogenous event-the
Bubonic Plague outbreak-prompted the Tulip Mania and brought
common, unsophisticated investors into the futures market.4 5 From
1635-1637 the plague devastated the Netherlands.a6 Over 17,000 people
were killed in Amsterdam in 1636 (1/7 of the population). 47 Leiden lost
over 14,000 (1/3 of its 1622 population).48 The Dutch faced a heightened
probability of death by plague and imminent invasion by Spain during
1635-1637, when Tulip Mania was at its peak.49
The rumors of war and the hideous plague caused a gambling
outbreak. Gamblers, with death at the door, had nothing to lose by
speculating in tulips. Because of the legal prohibitions, the contracts
remained unenforceable. If the gamblers "won," they would receive a
windfall. If they lost, the gamblers could ignore the contract because
they did not have to fear being excluded from the bourse. These Dutch,
under perceived death sentences, could "bet the house" without recourse
or remorse. These wild gambles had no structural connection to the
underlying futures market in tulips. But their bets caused temporary
42. Avraham Kamara, Market Trading Structures and Asset Pricing: Evidence From
The Treasury-Bill Markets, THE REV. OF FIN. STUDIES, No. 4, 357, 358-59 (1988).
43. FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 46 (quoting JOHANN BECKMANN,
HISTORY OF INVENTIONS, DISCOVERIES, AND ORIGINS (Harry G. Bohn, 4th ed. 1826)).
44. Id. at 45.
45. Id. at 37-38; see also THE TULIP, supra note 22, at 159 (speculating that the
plague caused a shortage of labor, "perhaps improving wages so dramatically, that for the
first time in their lives, bricklayers, carpenters, woodcutters and plumbers had money to
lose").
46. See FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 37.
47.
48.

See id.
See id.

49.

See id. at 38.
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gyrations and dislocations that led to increased regulation and moral
disapprobation.
Serious and substantial tulip traders were not affected by the new
speculative markets taking place in taverns.50 Major traders possessed
substantial capital and enjoyed access to the capital markets. Short sales
would also have required substantial capital and sound credit.5" The
astonishingly high prices
centered on the rare bulbs during the majority
52
speculation.
tulip
of the
Tulip prices collapsed in February of 1637. 53 There was a general
suspension of settlements for contracts coming due. 54 Florists proposed
that contracts before November 30, 1636, should be executed and
honored.5 5 Later contracts would give the buyer the right to reject the
contract on payment by the buyer of 10% of the sales price.56 The Dutch
authorities rejected the proposal.57 In April, Holland suspended all
contracts giving the seller the right to sell at market prices during the
suspension.5 8 Thus, growers were released to market the bulbs in June.59
Other avenues of settlement followed. For example, Haarlem permitted
buyers to avoid the contract upon payment of 3.5 percent of the contract
60
price.
The courts did not uphold the contracts, but local settlements were
agreed upon by growers and florists. 6 1 This modest frenzy, fueled by
novice speculators immune from enforcement, (but not death), died out.
The tulip markets returned to normal with little lasting effect upon the
vibrant commerce of the Netherlands.
The Dutch market for tulip futures arose because of a convergence
of factors, including trade, increased globalization, specialization in
commerce and finance, and a rising middle class and prosperous
population. The Dutch futures market for tulips created wealth and
supported a much-coveted product that transferred risk to willing

50. Id. at 46.
51. Id.
52. The high prices were to be expected for markets in rare bulbs. "Common bulbs
became objects of speculation among the lower classes in a future market which emerged
in November 1636. These markets were located in local taverns, and each sale was
associated with a payment of "wine money." Garber- 1990, supra note 16, at 39.
53. See FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 44.

54. See id. at 61.
55.

See id.

56. See id.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 62.
Id.
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takers-professional speculators who financed horticulturists (growers)
and florists (sellers) and the horticulturalists and florists themselves.
Contemporary Perceptions of Tulip Mania.62 We have seen that
speculation in tulips and tulip futures were discouraged investments
because of their risk and probably because of the frivolous association
with wealth and luxury. Tulip futures certainly were not as safe and
respected as investments that were critical for Dutch prosperity like the
India Companies, the Baltic grain trade or the North Sea fisheries.63
Tulips and, later, coffee 64 appeared to be dangerous fads-financially
and morally.
Stock Markets and Speculation. The Netherlands of Tulip Mania
already had developed stock markets that were alive with speculation.
The first chronicler of stock markets was Joseph Penso de la Vega, in
Confusion de Confusiones (1688).65 Vega described the market as a
"[G]ame [of speculation that] is an affair of fools. ' 6 6 He further
described exchange behavior in actions that can still be found on the
floors of the stock and commodity exchanges.
A member of the Exchange opens his hand and another takes it, and
thus sells a number of shares at a fixed price, which is confirmed by a
secret handshake. With a new handshake a further item is offered, and
then follows a bid. The hands redden from the blows (I believe the
shame that even the most respected people do business in such an
indecent manner as with blows.) The handshakes are followed by
shouting, the shouting by insults, the insults by impudence and more
insults, shouting, pushes, and handshakes until the business is finished.6 7
Vega described speculators as "[F]ull of instability, pride and
will sell without knowing the motive; they will buy
foolishness. They
68
reason.,
without
Tulip Speculation. As the Netherlands became increasingly more
prosperous, dabblers entered the tulip markets. 69 The movement was not
62.

For a discussion of contemporary perceptions of Tulip Mania, see Christian C.

Day, PaperConspiraciesand the End ofAll Good Order: Perceptions and Speculation in
Early Capital Markets, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L. J. 283, 295-98 (2006) [hereinafter
Paper Conspiracies].
63. See FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 33-34.
64. See generally DAVID LIss, THE COFFEE TRADER (Random House 2003).
65. DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 11.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13.
69.

See generally DEBORAH MOGGACH, TULIP FEVER (Vintage 2000) (detailing

working class laborers and small businessmen entering the risky market only under the
assurance that it would go up). The author's rendering is based upon Schama and other
sources; however, her financial and legal observations are faulty as they are based on
Charles Mackay's ExtraordinaryPopularDelusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841).
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unlike the upsurge of day-traders and first-time investors during the Dotcom craze of the later 1990s. "Private negotiations between individuals
gave way to informal trading in rooms of inns, called Colleges ....
These trades were described in a contemporary pamphlet of dialogues
between a speculator, Gaergoedt (Greedy Goods) and his friend
Waermondt (True-Mouth).
You must go to an Inn [says Gaergoedt]; I will name a few. I know
of few or none, where there are no companies or colleges. Being there,
you must ask whether there are any florists. If you then come into their
room and because you are a newcomer some will squeak like a duck.
Some will say, "A new whore in the brothel," and so on, but don't take
any notice; that goes with it. Your name will be put down on a slate.
Now the plates go round. That is, everyone who is present at this
company has to give plates, beginning with the one at the top of the slate.
He who holds the plate must ask for some goods. You may not put up on
auction your own goods, but if you drop a hint in conversation, and
somebody is interested, you are almost sure to have it bid for or to get the
71
plates on it.
Speculators were certain that their gains could be spent on
luxuries. 72 "All grandeurs were imagined. No one knew how high he
would rise in his estate." 73 During the height of Tulip Mania, all bulbs,
74
both rare and common, increased in price.
A contemporary pamphleteer calculated that the 2,500 guilders paid
for a single bulb would have bought twenty-seven tons of wheat, fifty
tons of rye, four fat oxen, eight fat pigs, twelve fat sheep, two hogsheads
of wine, four tuns of beer, two tuns of butter, three tons of cheese, a bed
with linen, a wardrobe of clothes, and silver beaker.7 5
It is reported that speculators paid no heed to the prices as they
intended to sell quickly.76 Gaergoedt urged Waermondt to invest:
"[Y]ou give no money till it's summer, and then you have sold all your
' 77
stuff.
The over-heated market broke and tulip prices crashed. 78 The
tulip investments "[V]iolated the Calvinist work ethic." 79 Waermondt
has the last word on economics and morality in the Dialogues:

70.

DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 17.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 18.
73.
1937, J.
74.
75.

Id. (quoting N.W. Posthumus, The Tulip Mania in Holland in the Years 1936OF ECON. AND Bus. HIST. I 462 (1928-29)).
FAMOus FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 16, 133-44.
DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 19.

76.
77.

Id.
Id.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 20.
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[W]hat need is there for merchants to have any style, or to risk their
goods overseas, for the children to learn a trade, for peasants to sow
and to work so hard on the soil, for the skipper to sail on the terrible
and dangerous seas, for the soldier
80 to risk his life for so little gain, if
one can make profits of this sort?
The Dialogues and other contemporary pamphlets sum up the
popular view of Tulip Mania, that the "[B]ubble grew rapidly, delighting
beholders with its reflective brilliance, but disappearing instantly. It was
sustained only by air or wind, a symbolism recognized in both the
seventeenth-century Dutch windhandel to describe the futures trade and
in [contemporary art depicting] tulpenwoerde....
Flora's Chariot of Fools, the original painting by Hendrik Pot, and
a popular similar print, entitled Floraes Mallewagen (Flora's Car of
Fools), portray Flora in a wind chariot (representing both a varitas
allegory and a satire on the trading).82 Her associates are drinking and
travelling light. One of the girls on the chariot is weighing the bulbs
while the other girl releases a bird, symbolizing the loss of innocence.
The sojourners are not alone. A crowd follows clamoring to be let on.
Broken tulips strew the road and another chariot can be seen sinking
beneath the waves. 83
Thus, contemporary accounts portrayed Tulip Mania as a
speculative folly that undermined the economy and morality.8 4 These
accounts were bereft of any appreciation of the economic role of
speculation and the importance of futures, even frivolous tulip futures, 5
to the Dutch economy, and ultimately modem economies. Yet these
images have shaped our perceptions of futures, speculative investments,
and market behavior.

80.
81.

Id. at 20 (quoting N.W. Posthumus, supra note 73, at 452).
Id.at 21.

82.

EMBARRASSMENT OF RICHES, supra note 39, at 363.

83. Id. at 363-64; see also DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 21
(describing the allegory of the artwork); MARIET WESTERMANN, THE ART OF THE DUTCH
REPUBLIC 1585-1718, at 54 (Lawrence King Publishing 1996) (Describing that the wind
chariot was an actual device that took advantage of the wind's bounty. The ingenious
vehicle was invented by Simon Stevin (1548-1620), the court engineer of the Stadhouder
Maurtis (a Dutch hero in the long war of independence against the Spanish). Stevin was
also famous for his military fortifications.).
84. See DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 24 (comparing Garber's belief
that many of the accounts were government propaganda to Chancellor's argument that
they followed a conventional method of recording events and moralizing, probably
containing considerable truths).
85. Tulips, once a fad and a luxury for the wealthy and nobility, of course became a
leading Dutch export.
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III. THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (1720): MONETIZING THE NATIONAL
DEBT AND CORNERING THE MARKET. 86

Commonalities run throughout the history of these early market
bubbles. New finance instruments were exploited: options in Holland
and joint stock shares and national debt refunding in England. All of this
exploitation occurred against a backdrop of developing legal and
financial institutions.
An understanding of these complex and
sophisticated matters lagged significantly.
The Dutch had their moralists who railed through time against the
ridiculous excesses of the tulip market. The South Sea Company Bubble
occurred during a high point of English intellectual brilliance. Great
writers and thinkers such as Daniel Defoe, 87 Alexander Pope, 88 Jonathan
Swift89-every literary light great and small-speculated. No less a
luminary than Sir Isaac Newton was a speculator. 90 Their writings and
sayings preserved their pungent observations for posterity-thus shaping
our opinions of the events. The South Sea Bubble also had to its credit a
colorful cast of rouges such as John Blunt,9' Robert Knight (the cashier
86. See generally Christian C. Day, Address at Association for the Study of Law,
Culture & the Humanities Conference, University of Connecticut School of Law: Chaos
in the Markets-Moral,Legal & Economic Signals in Three Fantastic Bubbles (Mar. 12,
2004); Christian C. Day, Chaos in the Markets-Moral,Legal & Economic Signals in
Three FantasticBubbles, 85 FIN. HIST. 24 (Winter 2006); PaperConspiracies,supra note
62, at 298-322.
87. MALCOLM BALEN, THE KING, THE CROOK, AND THE GAMBLER 113 (Fourth Estate
2002) [hereinafter BALEN].
88. See MALCOLM BALEN, THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 113
(Fourth Estate 2002).
89. See id.
90. Newton initially made substantial profits and then re-invested; he lost ultimately
£20,000. See JOHN CARSWELL, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE 108 (Sutton Publishing 2001)
(1960) [hereinafter CARSWELL]. Newton confessed to not understanding the market.
"When asked about the direction of the market, he is reported to have replied, 'I can
calculate the motions of the heavenly bodies, but not the madness of the people."' DEVIL
TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 69.
91. John Blunt (1665-1733) was the son of a Rochester shoemaker who rose to
become a director of the South Sea Company and a leading player in the South Sea
Bubble. See generally BALEN, supra note 87, at 22-36. He began his career as a
scrivener. Id. His work with merchants and landowners gave him insight into business
dealings which he put to good use, becoming a very rich man due to his investments in
real estate. Id. Blunt became company secretary of the Sword Blade Company, placing
him in contact with several men who would become leading players in the South Sea
Company. Id. As early as 1710 Blunt impressed Chancellor Robert Harley with his
ideas on funding the national debt. Id. In November 1719, Blunt presented his plan to
have the South Sea Company "incorporate the whole of the National Debt, including the
debts owed to the Bank of England and the East India Company ... " P.G.M. DICKSON,
THE FINANCIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC

CREDIT 1688-1756 95 (1967). Because of his relatively-low birth, Blunt was seen as a
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who fled England to the Continent), 92 members of Parliament who took
bribes,93 ladies in waiting 94 who invested on the basis of rumor and
gossip, the King and his court who were insiders and took their profits
before the bubble burst, and throngs of common investors who dabbled
in the innovative joint stock companies (Bubble companies and others).
Their common (mis)understanding of the Bubble still dominates our
view of this scheme to refund and monetize the national debt.
The South Sea Bubble story begins in a time of great optimism and
hope in England. 95 England had been victorious in war. 96 She was
expanding her overseas empire. 97 The invasion of the Old Pretender, son
of James I, was defeated at Glenshiel in Scotland. 98 The dangerous
royal rebels were in exile in France. George I was increasingly secure on
his throne. His speech that opened Parliament on November 23, 1719
was upbeat:
All Europe as well as these Kingdoms, are on the point of being
delivered.., by the influence of British arms and counsels... so far
as Prudence can foretell the Unanimity of this Session of Parliament
must establish, with the Peace of all Europe, the Glory and Trade of
these Kingdoms, on a lasting foundation. I think that every Man may
see the End of our Labours: all I have to 99
ask of you is, that you will
agree to be a great and flourishing People.

The pump was primed for commercial expansion to bring even
greater prosperity to the realm. The joint stock company l0 and the
refunding of the national debt (to create capital for investment) would
classic overreacher when the bubble burst. In 1721, he was arrested for his role and
penalized. At the end of his life he was prosecuted for the misuse of arms in the Court of
Chivalry. See CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 246.
92. DICKSON, supra note 91, at I11.
93. See RICHARD DALE, THE FIRST CRASH: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE
92 (2004); FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES, supra note 15, at 111 (stating that the Company paid
£1.3 million in bribes to members of Parliament and the King's favorites). Bribery for
important projects was the coin of the realm. "Indeed, that Parliament and the
government supported the refunding so enthusiastically must have served as a signal that
official cooperation in South Sea's ventures had been purchased." Id. at 112.
94. Women invested a great deal in the market because there were no restrictions on
owning shares. This was not the case in real property investments where the law of male
entail held sway. See DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 79-80.
95. DICKSON, supra note 91, at 90.
96. Id.
97. See DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 58.
98. See id.
99. DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 58.
100. See FRANKLIN GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES INCORPORATE LAW 3 (Thompson West
2006) ("The term joint stock comes from the fact that... the merchant members [in the
trading companies] chipped in money to buy a common stock of goods for trade (the joint
stock), instead of each merchant trading on his own company's franchise.").
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flood England with productive enterprises and create even greater wealth
and prosperity.
By 1695 there were 100 joint stock companies with £4 million in
nominal capital--one ninth the estimated value of all the personal
property in the realm. 0 1 They were traded briskly on ill-organized
capital markets.' °2 Good stocks and bonds were thought to be, and were,
very good substitutes to land rents from agriculture.' 0 3 Land rents were
steady and reliable. But, new investments in industry and commerce,
represented by stocks and bonds, provided helpful leverage and offered
the dream of great wealth.
The public was passionate about credit.'0 4 New theories of public
finance circulated and supported economic expansion. The law lagged
far behind finance and corporate structures.
Civil recovery was
10 5
expensive and rarely pursued.
Indeed, false pretense was not a crime
until 1757.106 Thus, promoters and the unscrupulous could take
advantage of the unwary by offering clever schemes and new ventures
for making money without fear of civil or criminal retribution. Indeed,
there were even substantial difficulties in collection of promissory
notes! 10 7 As with Holland, the law lagged behind the financial
structures. 1°8 In addition, anti-fraud measures and protections in the
market or for face-to-face fraud were non-existent.
The Origin of the South Sea Company and the Refunding of
Redeemables.
In 1711, the South Sea Company was originally
chartered to trade in the South Seas (the Caribbean basin) with Spanish
colonies. 10 9 It also enjoyed a monopoly on the slave trade to that
CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 8.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. John Law was a leading exponent of this new attitude. Law (1671-1729) was the
brilliant Scot financier who crafted monetary policy centuries ahead of his time and paid
the price for his innovation when the French economy imploded with the Mississippi
Company Bubble (1719-1720). Law's Mississippi System, which produced Europe's
first stock market boom, was predicated upon refunding and monetizing France's huge
public debt. For a while it appeared bound to succeed, promising to solidify France's
claim of primacy in Europe. The threat posed by Law and his economic plans spurred
the English debt refunding scheme. For more on John Law, see ANTOIN E. MURPHY,
101.

JOHN LAW: ECONOMIC THEORIST AND POLICY-MAKER (1997) [hereinafter JOHN LAW] and
JANET GLEESON,

MILLIONAIRE:

THE PHILANDERER,

GAMBLER,

AND

DUELIST WHO

INVENTED MODERN FINANCE (1999).
105.
CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 11.

106.

Id.

107.

Id. at 15.

108. What is past is prologue. The Special Purpose Entities employed in Enron were
modem innovations beyond the edge of law.
109. The company's coat of arms displayed the motto "A Gaibus usque Auroram."
"From Cadiz [still held to be the empire's last outpost] to the Dawn." BALEN, supra note

87, at 31; DALE, supra note 93, at 40.
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region. 10 Because of war with Spain, the South Sea Company's purpose
was frustrated.111 It found a new life in 1713 with its successful
conversion of government short term debt to long term debt and its
reduction in interest paid to the annuitants.' 1 2 Short term debt interest
was reduced to five percent.1 13 Short term annuities at nine percent were
refinanced and replaced with long term annuities at seven percent.114
This refinancing was a boon to the government and investors alike. The
redemption put liquid capital into the markets when annuitants who
accepted the buyouts offered by the redemption redeployed their capital.
English refunding, unlike that of the French, was limited by due
process. The government could not change the terms unilaterally for the
"irredeemables" (long term debt). 1 5 But "irredeemables" could be
exchanged for cash or stock with the consent of the annuitants. 1' In
contrast, "redeemables" were short term obligations representing lottery
tickets, sailors' stubs, scrip, etc.117
From 1713 to 1719, South Sea stock increased in value, largely due
to the successful refunding and the conclusion of a peace treaty with
Spain in 1719 that would open up the Caribbean. The market was also
on an upswing as peace was breaking out in Europe, and new
opportunities appeared to abound.1 18 So did new threats.11 9
The John Law System for revolutionizing public finance was being
implemented with apparent success in France. 120 That boded ill for
England, as France threatened to become the dominant financial power
in Europe. 12 1 England was greatly concerned about the juggernaut Law
122
was designing and its effect on political power and capital markets.
The British endeavored to counteract it with a refunding system of their
own.

110. See BALEN, supra note 87, at 31; DALE, supranote 93, at 40.
111. See BALEN, supra note 87, at 32, 34; DALE, supra note 79, at 49-50; DICKSON,
supra note 91, at 93.
112.

DICKSON, supra note 91, at 92.

113. Id. at 92.
114. Id.
115. DALE, supra note 93, at 73; DICKSON, supra note 91, at 92.
116. DICKSON, supranote 91, at 92.
117. See CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 86 (commenting that the common feature of
redeemable debt was that it could be redeemed under Walpole's sinking fund). Sailors
stubs and scrip were paper given for wages in lieu of money.
118. See DICKSON, supra note 91, at 94 ("A tidal wave of speculation and Company
flotation, initiated in Paris, was already beginning to rise in all the commercial centres in
Europe.").
119. See id.
120. See generally JOHN LAW, supra note 104.
121. BALEN, supra note 87, at 66.
122. Id. at 66-67; DALE, supra note 93, at 73.
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The South Sea Company and the Refunding of the National
Debt. As fortune would have it, the Company was in search for new
adventures. It did not enjoy the power or the prestige of the Bank of
123
England nor the lucrative monopoly of the East India Company.
Because the English government was alarmed by Law's success, it
listened to the Company's plan to take over substantial portions of the
national debt and refinance it at rates favorable to the state. 24 The
capital gains from the newest refinancing could be plowed into England
capital markets, commerce, and industry-propelling England to greater
heights. The Company's plan would take advantage of rising stock
prices that were linked to the Law System and what would become
known as the Mississippi Bubble. (These London and Paris capital
markets were linked, and fund transfers influenced these bubbles.)
In 1719, John Law, the French minister of finance, had copied
25
English lottery ticket conversions to refund part of the French debt.1
The Company was now prepared to copy Law.' 26 The Company struck a
deal with the Treasury to exchange government debt for Company
stock.' 27 Bills were introduced authorizing the South Sea Company
refunding.
Members of Parliament were bribed with stock and cash to
pass the conversion legislation. 129 Indeed, bribes were of massive
proportions; such was the state of political affairs in the eighteenth
century when bribes were common and greased the wheels for
legislation, appointments, and government contracts. 30 In addition, the
Company paid a veritable King's ransom to the government for the
conversion privilege. The maximum payable was £7,567,503.'
(This
was an above-board payment that compensated the government for the
right to engage in this lucrative arbitrage. In modern terms, this was a
franchise fee. A modern example is land use exactions required of
developers.)
Paymaster General Walpole noted, in his minutes, the scheme to aid
commerce and trading by freeing up encumbrances associated with the
123.
124.
125.
126.

DICKSON, supra note 91, at 93-94.
Id. at 94.
See DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21, at 60-62.
See id.

127.

CARSWELL,

supra note 90, at 87.

128.
129.

DICKSON, supra note 91, at 102.
BALEN, supra note 87, at 76; CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 95; DICKSON, supra
note 91, at 110-12, 119.

130.

BALEN, supra note 87, at 76. Parliament required a conversion fee from the
The fee was set originally at £1.5 million, but eventually grew to over
£7.5 million. DICKSON, supra note 91, at 97, 100. Thus, Parliament had an interest in
rising Company stock prices, for the higher the stock prices, the more the state would
earn from the Company's privilege of converting the national debt.
131. BALEN, supra note 87, at 80; DICKSON, supra note 91, at 100.
Company.
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annuities.132 Annuities were deemed by society to be less liquid than
shares. Further, capital gains obtained by investors from market gains on
the stock would be used in other productive capacities, increasing the
economy's leverage.
The Bank of England, its predominance in the capital markets
threatened, also prepared plans for tackling the conversion.133 This
competition eventually forced the Company to promise to pay franchise
fees totaling £7.5 million.' 34 This payment cut the Company's profit
margins considerably. 35 For the conversion to work, both the
government and the Company required a rising stock market.' 3 6 The
rising market increased the value of the shares as consideration for the
exchange and made the exchange more lucrative for the annuitants.
37
Indeed, profits hinged on a rising stock market.1
Company stock was valued at £100 par (and the company was
required by law to receive that in consideration for the shares).' 38 The
general arrangement of the refunding follows: for each £100 of long
term debt, the Company could issue an additional £2000 in par value
shares. 139 (These conversion ratios were based upon discounting the face
amount of the annuity and the income stream to net present value. The
conversion values reflected a reasonably accurate and honest estimate of
the future value of the income stream.) Thus, 20 shares could be issued
at par to fund the debt. The shares could be exchanged with annuitants
or issued to the public. For each £100 of short term debt, par value of the
Company increased by £1400, representing 14 shares. 140 As the bubble
expanded and fueled its expansion, the Company made generous loans
132. Robert Walpole described the scheme thus:
[T]o consult the landed and trading interest of the nation, by lessening its
incumbrances [sic] and public debts, and putting them in a method of being
paid off in a few years; which could not have been done, unless a way had been
found to make the Annuities for long terms redeemable; which had been
happily effected by the South-Sea Scheme, without a breach of parliamentary
faith.
DICKSON, supra note 91, at 97, citingParl.Hist. vii. 690, 20 Dec. 1720.
Sir Robert Walpole was a great man and the first modem prime minister. His long
stewardship in the eighteenth century established a strong financial foundation for the
British economy. For Walpole's role in the South Sea Bubble, see EDWARD PEARCE, THE
GREAT MAN: SIR ROBERT WALPOLE: SCOUNDREL, GENIUS AND BRITAIN'S FIRST PRIME

MINISTER 97-148 (2007).
133. BALEN, supra note 87, at 80; DALE, supra note 93, at 75.
134. BALEN, supra note 87, at 80; DALE, supra note 93, at 76. 1 use the convention of
assessing the fee at £7.5 million for simplicity's sake.
135. See DICKSON, supranote 91, at 101.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. BALEN, supra note 87, at 102.
139. DICKSON, supra note 91, at 104.
140. Id. at 104.
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against shares to encourage the purchase of even more shares. Very high
margins were permitted for subscriptions with as little as one eighth
down and the balance due within several years (to be financed, the
buyers hoped, by rising share prices). The diagram of the scheme is
shown in Appendix 1 and in an excellent summary prepared by Professor
Richard Dale.
A natural question is why annuitants would surrender a seven
percent irredeemable for Company stock with a par of £l0O.141 This
suggests the annuity would be surrendered at a discount! The reason is
that annuitants were similar to present day lottery winners or tort
settlement holders who desired to liquidate the income stream in
exchange for a lump sum payment, in this case shares of stock. The
shares could be liquidated by selling to other investors and the annuitants
would possess cash. Annuitants who converted at £200 also enjoyed a
gain of £ 100 as accounting principles calculated a capital gain as value in
excess of par. 42 Further, without violating accounting conventions or
the law, joint stock companies could declare dividends from these
"profits," which were in reality capital surplus. 14 3 Investors bought
Company stock because of these "profits."' 144 In a perfect world with
accurate financial accounting and reporting, the profits would have come
from the value of the arbitrage (the difference between what the
Company paid for the debt and the income stream, as well as other
Company investments). Profits also could be legitimately taken in
modern terms by selling the shares for greater than the purchase price (a
capital gain).
Further, during the Bubble, the Company declared
dividends based upon this source of capital. The dividends
were large
45
and fueled further speculation and purchases of the stock.1
Nowadays, substantial corporate procedures must be followed to
declare dividend out of capital surplus (notice to investors of the source,

141.

In reality, shares traded in excess of par throughout the Bubble. The higher the

share price (the amount for which annuitants were willing to part with for their cash
stream), the greater the discount. Annuitants who traded irredeemables for Company
shares hoped to profit by high share prices, not the ultimate arbitrage that was to produce

a smooth flow of dividends.
Other investors treated the high-priced stock as options and rationally walked away
from further installments when the prices tumbled. See Gary S. Shea, FinancialMarket
Analysis Can Go Mad (in searchfor irrationalbehaviour during the South Sea Bubble),
60 ECON. HIST. REV. 742, 747 (2007).

142. Modem standards require this to be treated as capital and any excess above par is
treated as capital surplus. It certainly is not "gain" and can not be cashed out for
dividends. Eighteenth century conventions permitted both!
143.
144.

DALE, supra note 93, at 80.
Id. at 101.

145.

See DALE, supra note 93, at 101; see DICKSON, supra note 91, at

141.
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etc.). In addition, capital surplus 146 is not treated as profits or gain. Yet,
such treatments were common and legal in the early capital markets.
Further, as there were no standard accounting
procedures or guidelines,
47
accurate financial reports were non-existent. 1
To review, the refunding scheme came about because the
government could not unilaterally abridge, or alter, the irredeemables or
long term debt. 48 A voluntary exchange for capital stock was called
for. 14 9 The government mandated the amount of stock the Company
could issue but not the exchange ratios. 50 Indeed, the failure to establish
exchange ratios permitted the rapid rise in the stock prices.' 51 Both the
government and the Company had an interest in this structural
shortcoming. It is unclear if exchange-ratio failure came about by
accident or design. Perhaps it was a "happy accident" that occurred
because accounting rules and financial structures were rapidly evolving.
It is unlikely that the participants engineered the defect. However, they
certainly took advantage of it. The Treasury was given some latitude to
repay the debt early, cancel stock, or reduce interest-so some genuine
risks to investors were also present.
The refunding execution was complicated. It became more complex
as the refunding continued and market interest heightened. The
Company's internal fiscal controls were not up to the sophisticated
accounting demanded of it.' 52 The Company lacked good internal
53
records of either the irredeemables offered or the demand for shares.
Hence, it could not accurately price the shares. Further pricing decisions
were complicated by the confusion of capital surplus with "profit."
Sound external analysis was also absent. Neither buyer nor seller could
price the conversion with any degree of accuracy.
The extension of refunding to redeemables brought the Company
into direct competition and conflict with the Bank of England. Instead of
146. Modem accounting and corporate finance permit corporations to transfer
retained earnings (profits) to capital surplus, hence boosting the capital account on the
company's books. But that was not the practice in the eighteenth century.
147. Cf DALE, supra note 93, at 90. This is one of the reasons why it was so difficult
to untangle these bubbles and remains so to this day.
148. See DICKSON, supranote 91, at 92.
149. Id. at 92-93.
150. Walpole wanted to lock the Company into a fixed exchange rate. See BALEN,
supra note 87, at 81. Blunt successfully opposed such a condition. Id.
151. Modem practice in corporate acquisitions is to establish exchange ratios.
"Collars" protect buyers and sellers from wild market fluctuations. Some acquisition
agreements provide formulas for adjustments beyond the collar. Others give the parties
"walking privileges" if the market price at the time of the closing is outside the terms of
the deal. These practices developed much later and were not employed in the refunding.
152. BALEN, supra note 88, at 206.
153.

Id.
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exchanging stock for annuities and calculating the amount left over (the
profit on the arbitrage), the Company continued to offer new, highly
leveraged subscriptions.1 1 4 Ultimately there were four subscriptions,
with the Fourth Subscription asking £1000 per share! 155 Thus the value
of the stock was both devalued (because it was based on the income
stream) and, paradoxically, overvalued due to all the interest in the
conversion and stock prices.156 Exchanges took place later than
contemplated and terms and conditions were altered twice. 57 There was
other joint stock shares,
a "frenzied" competition for Company stock,
158
scrip.
and
companies,
illegitimate Bubble
The Company marketed ever more shares to take advantage of the
rising prices and to fund the conversion and profits.159 Other companies
jumped in, including notorious Bubble Companies that had no legitimate
investments and were pure swindles. 160 In this market a number of
legitimate companies also were launched in insurance and banking, 6but
there were a number of unscrupulous firms that stole from investors.' '
Europe seemed to be awash in magical credit.' 62 The Mississippi
Company Bubble percolated and disintermediated funds from Paris and
Amsterdam pushed prices even higher. 63 The shortage of shares and
scrip pushed prices even higher.' 64 Rogue companies sucked up funds
from the Company and other established investments.' 65 The share price
increased and peaked 67in excess of £1,100 in June 1720.166 Then the
transfer books closed.1

The Bubble Act; the Bubble Deflates. Meanwhile the Company
sought to protect itself through the intervention of Parliament. 68 The
result was the Bubble Act of 1720 wherein Parliament outlawed the
unchartered Bubble Companies that had arisen to take advantage of the
market. 69 The Bubble Act and the subsequent prosecution of Bubble
154.
155.

156.
157.

DALE, supra note 93, at 98-101.
BALEN, supra note 87, at 133-34; CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 145-46.
BALEN, supra note 87, at 133-34; CARSWELL, supra note 90, at 145-46.
DICKSON, supra note 91, at 123.

158. Id.
159. Id.; DALE, supra note 93, at 98-101. Again, modem corporate accounting
controls would have precluded this type of unprecedented stock creation. Auditors and
controllers would have required some economic basis for the underlying exchange ratio.
160. BALEN, supra note 87, at 89-92; DALE, supra note 93, at 107-08.
161. BALEN, supra note 87, at 89-92; DALE, supra note 93, at 107-08.
162. See BALEN, supra note 87, at 89-92; DALE, supra note 93, at 107-08.
163. DICKSON, supra note 91, at 140-41.
164. Id. at 144.
165. See BALEN, supra note 87, at 89-92.
166. BALEN, supranote 87, at 114.
167. DALE, supra note 93, at 106.

168.

See DICKSON, supra note 91, at 147.

169.

BALEN,

supra note 87, at 105-06; DICKSON, supra note 91, at 148.
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170
Companies by the Treasury Solicitor ushered in the fall of the stock.
On August 18 the stock began to fall and hampered the Fourth

Subscription, pegged at an astounding £1000.17 1

Desperate attempts

were made to staunch the descent. 72 The Company declared a 30%
Christmas Dividend; it hawked a dividend guarantee of 50% for the next
73
12 years.

The government prosecution of the Bubble Companies had
unintended consequences. The smaller bubbles could not be popped
without destroying the Company's Bubble. 174 Amsterdam's exchange
76
75
Gold flooded out of London.
rate rose sharply against London's.
Londoners were selling off their gains to invest in Amsterdam; 77 the
Bubble imploded. 78 Prices dropped to £300 by October 79 and settled
below £200 by the end of the year (£191 in December 1720-a drop of
over 600 points since September 1).18 ° Officers and insiders fled to the
Continent. Directors were disgraced. The Company's rivals, the Bank
of England and the East India Company, rode to the rescue, stabilized the
market and completed the debt conversion.1 81
The Bubble Post Mortem.
England experienced a normal
depression, lasting several years, after the collapse. The lasting effect of
the Bubble was the Bubble Act that set back and thwarted British
commercial development until it was finally repealed in the 1840s. By
then England was destined to lose the corporate footrace to its upstart

170.

DICKSON, supra note 91, at 149.

171.
172.

Id.
See id.

173. BALEN, supra note 87, at 135; DICKSON, supra note 91, at 149. A 30% dividend
is £30; £50 represents a 50% dividend. These are phenomenal returns on £100 par
shares. Even at £50 on a £1000 investment, the 5% yield would look respectable. Then
there was the potential for cashing out on the £900 "profit." In reality this would be a
distribution of capital surplus if paid by the company. But it would be an inducement for
someone to offer the buyer even more for the share. If he sold quickly, let us say for
£1100, his profit (£100) could be quite great because he undoubtedly bought on margin.
For example, assume Newton bought a share for £1000, but his down payment was only
£125. If he assigned his right to receive the share (like an option) to the buyer, he would
receive £100 on the £125 out-of-pocket, a very nifty return, cash on cash, once his buyer
honored the seller's installment obligation.
174.

DICKSON, supra note 91, at 150.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

151.
152.
149.
159.
163. 170-72.
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child, the United States, in a large part owing to
the legal restrictions
82
placed upon corporate entities in the Bubble Act.
Finally, the South Seas Bubble was part of an international capital
movement speculating in the refinancing and refunding of government
debt (a great benefit to both France and England if successfully
accomplished). The revolutionary financial theories of John Law and
others were put to work to alter the oppressive structure of vast
government debts incurred in the wars between 1689 and 1714. Laid on
top of the refunding were the extremely optimistic and heart-felt
economic and commercial development plans that captivated
governments and investors alike. The Company refunding failed for a
want of capital and for want of a legal, accounting and financial structure
to support such a great enterprise. The Company's failure is echoed in
the contemporaneous collapse of the Mississippi Bubble and the Law
System in France.
There was a social setting to this bubble not too dissimilar from that
of Holland or Law's France. These bubbles were set in great towns,
places of ambition, culture, fame and fortune (and fortune hunters).
There were high death rates, disease, misery, and wealth. There was
uncertainty about the future. Financial frauds were not easily punished
by the law. Life could be short and brutal. Deceit in revenue dealings
was still common.1 83 There was a debased public morality and an
appetite for gain. All these social factors contributed to gambling in the
capital markets.
Ultimately, what remains is a rational scheme for the necessary
refunding of public debt that was flawed by design. The goal of
refunding was certainly necessary and appropriate. The method of
exchanging annuities for shares to reduce the debt and provide liquidity
was fundamentally sound in theory. It had been employed by the
Amsterdam banks to fund Dutch national debt during their magnificent
seventeenth century, the Bank of England was to use it for great
advantage during the eighteenth century, and this model would launch
the United States on the road to becoming a great republic of commerce.
The national debt refunding left something to be desired. The
failure to fix exchange rates was critical (similar to the Dutch failure to
link tulip option settlements to the "exchange" price structure).
Accounting and corporate finance are also culprits. The Company was
182.

In the United States, the state governments were liberal in their support of new

business ventures, including corporate ones. With no Bubble Act legacy, the nineteenth
century saw the rapid industrialization of the United States by businesses using relatively
flexible corporate forms.
183. Deceitful revenue dealings are still common today, even in the United States and
the industrialized democracies, let alone developing nations.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:2

able to book capital surplus as gains and to declare dividends from the
surplus above par. This, too, proved to be fatal. There was a paucity of
civil protections for market torts and no effective criminal sanctions-the
unscrupulous could engage in face-to-face fraud with impunity. There
were no exchange regulations or required financial reports that might
have assisted the astute in puzzling out the fundamentals. These reforms
would arrive in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Ultimately, the South Sea Bubble and the collapse of the John Law
System in France were intrinsically entwined with market structure, legal
remedies, investor behavior and promoter cupidity. The schemes were
innovative and the concepts were sound, as evidenced by the successful
refunding and monetizing of national debt that later occurred in England
and America. Cupidity, corruption, greed, and the madness of the
crowds, all played a part in the collapse. But the underlying idea was
sound; it was just ahead of its time.
IV.

CONTEMPORARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOUTH SEA SCHEME AND

CAPITAL MARKETS

Seventeenth Century English Economic Thought. Throughout
the seventeenth century, English economic thought was evolving and
taking note of the movement from traditional, agriculture-based society
to a more commercial and market-based economy. 184 In the early
seventeenth century, the Lord Treasurer stated that money was "a base
creature whearof never any wise man spake without contempt."'' 85 "Sir
Francis Bacon evoked morality and the Council of Nice to condemn
usury, but he also explained that high interest rates inhibited agricultural
improvements for men would not 'labor upon drayning of Marshes, or in
any other good or ingenious device, but employ their Money to more
certaine Profitt at use."" 86 A moral economy of biblical balance and
certainty was giving way to an economy where "individual[s] had

184. JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTHCENTURY ENGLAND 78-79 (1978) [hereinafter ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY]. The

rejection of traditional, conservative values in favor of freewheeling commercialism and
market forces was roundly criticized at the end of the eighteenth century by the great
conservative thinker and politician Edmund Burke. Burke contended the rise of
financiers following the French Revolution had done manifestly great damage "The age
of chivalry is gone; that of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and the
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE
glory of Europe is extinguished forever."
REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 113 (1790).
185. ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 184, at 34. This of course
echoes Biblical sentiments: "For the love of money is the root of all evil .... IITimothy
6:10.
186. ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY, supra note 184, at 34.
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become subsumed in a depersonalized aggregation"' 87 because their
decisions were divorced from their consequences. ',,1888 Debate raged over
the power to maximize profits by setting price. Some saw this economic
freedom as preying on the poor. Others, such as Joseph Lee, a minister,
argued that "[t]he advancement of private persons will be the advantage
of the publick... if men by good husbandry, trenching, manuring their
Land, &c [sic] do better their Land, is not the Commonwealth inriched
thereby?"'189
English economic and commercial thought was advanced by
observation of their Dutch neighbors who enjoyed the most successful
and modem of European economies in the seventeenth century. English
thinkers sought to explain the Dutch success. R.W.K. Hinton observed
that the Dutch had demonstrated that "private profit led to 'national
strength and back to private profit."' 1 90 Observers were slowly coming
to believe in the idea of a "personal drive for private gain."' 191 By the end
of the seventeenth century, "[e]very index of economic growth showed
an advance: agricultural output, capital investment, imports from the
Indies and the New World, [and] the range and quantity of home
manufacturing." ' 92 Domestic consumption was at a high level. 93 The
English were enjoying a much higher standard of living and foreign trade
was burgeoning. 94 "Daniel Defoe hailed the period since 1680 as a
projecting age when men set their wits to designing 'Engines, and
Mechanical Motion,' a propensity greatly encouraged, he noted, by
' 95
stockjobbing."'
The stage was set: England in the early eighteenth century was in
the midst of the Commercial and Financial Revolutions which would
radically transform her economy and society. The invention of the joint
stock corporation enabled many participants to invest in companies, as
an alternative to traditional investments in land.' 96 Joint stock companies
and corporations had obvious advantages-management for the investor
was not labor-intensive, portfolios could be assembled offering the
security associated with diversification, and the opportunity to invest in
large scale enterprises both domestic and overseas, beyond the ken of the

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id. at 53.
Id. at 52-53.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 78-79.
Id.at 95.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.

196.

JoHN TRAIN, FAMOUS FNANCIAL FlAscos 88-89 (1985).
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average investor. 197 By the end of the seventeenth century, England had
over 100 companies engaged in banking, overseas trade, insurance and
industrial profits. Wealth and power were shifting away from the
aristocracy and landed gentry to urban investors, traders, stock-jobbers,
and merchants-servants of these twin economic revolutions. This
transfer of power and wealth conferred status on the new arrivals and
created tensions as the established order gave way to the brave new
world of finance and trade.1 98
Daniel Defoe, the Speculator. Merchants were undergoing a
transformation. In The Merchant, Edward Young compared "merchants
favourably with heroes, priests, kings and even the heat-giving
planets." 199 Alexander Pope, Richard Savage, and James Thompson also
praised merchants in their works.20 0 To Richard Steele, "the merchant
was 'the greatest Benefactor of the English Nation.' 20 1 "In Defoe's
20 2
work, the merchant's virtues almost define an Englishman's virtues."
Later, in the eighteenth century, the glorification began to wane. The
ideal of the merchant-prince continued, "but the self-made businessman
was disdained as an upstart, 3a social parvenu, a mere mushroom who
20
threatened the social order.,
In general, the literary merchant characters of the seventeenth
century were praised not for their business sense, but instead for their
gentlemanly qualities. 20 4
"Samuel Foote's The Nabob (1772)...
reflect[s] the tensions posed by the enormous wealth of the returning
nabobs who threatened the position of the landed classes by their wealth,
their newly acquired possessions, their ostentatious free spending and
their 'governing spirit.' 20 5 This was not a problem for Defoe, who
stated that "'[w]ealth is wisdom, he that is rich is wise,' . . . and since the
route to wealth ran via trade the gentleman should seek greater wealth by
following the merchant's lead., 20 6 Defoe also believed that 'a true-bred
Merchant is a Universal Scholar, his learning excells the meer scholar in
Greek and Latin, as much as does that of the Illiterate Person, that cannot
197.

Id.

198. Defoe had high regard for trade and manufacture, and sided with those forces
over the traditional land-based economy. See JOHN ROBERT MOORE, DANIEL DEFOE:
CITIZEN OF THE MODERN WORLD, 312 (1958) [hereinafter DANIEL DEFOE].
199. Neil McKendrick, Gentleman and Players' Revisited: The Gentlemanly Ideal,
The Business Ideal and the ProfessionalIdeal in English Literary Culture, in BUSINESS
LIFE AND PUBLIC POLICY 109 (Neil McKendrick & R.B. Outwaite eds., 1986).
200. Id. at 109-10.
201. Id. at 110.

202.

Id.

203.
204.
205.

Id.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 112.

206.

Id. at 118.
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read or write.' 20 7 However, Defoe believed that there was a greater
calling for people. Once a merchant accumulated his money, his
children could become "as good statesmen, judges or bishops as those of
the most antient [sic] families.,

20 8

"Once the trader has made his

legitimate and much valued fortune, he will be expected to seek to
convert it into land or the pursuit of public service. ,,209
Defoe, of course, had been a projector. In his first venture he
210
invested £200 into a diving engine patented by Joseph Williams.
Williams himself invested no money, and the invention was a bust.2 1'
Consequently, Williams received £2,360 for his worthless invention, one
in which he did not invest any of his own capital.212 Defoe lost all of the
capital he invested, as well as capital he gave to 'Williams
as a loan.
213
"patent-monger.
a
as
Williams
described
later
Defoe
Fourteen years later, Defoe invested in the raising of civet cats for
2 l4
the sake of perfume production, which had become a Dutch monopoly.

However, Defoe had to give up this investment, in order to meet prior
obligations, including those that stripped him of his property, during his
year of bankruptcy.2 15 Defoe ended up losing a total of £1,300 on this
venture.2 16
Defoe later invested £800 in stock of the African Company, which
had depreciated to £100 in value by the time he decided to withdraw his
investment in the Company.2 17
Despite this depreciation, Defoe
"supported the company's right to a fair return on its outlay and the
importance of the African trade (which he said could not be maintained
by the Separate Traders)., 218 However, "he saw the folly of delegating
all trade to vast organizations, which often substituted stockjobbing and
committee direction for effective personal management: 'we are so fond
of companies, it is a wonder we have not our very shoes blacked by one,
and a set of directors made rich at the expense of our very blackguards.' 219 The main reason for the African Company was to trade
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Id.
Id. at 118-19.
Id. at 119.
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DANIEL DEFOE, supra note 198, at 284.
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slaves, a practice Defoe believed to be profitable, although he believed it
to be morally wrong.22 °
Writing on John Law and the bubble Law had created, Defoe stated:
The case is plain, you must put on a sword, kill a beau or two, get
into Newgate, be condemned to be hanged, break prison, IF YOU
CAN,-remember that by the way,-get over to some strange
country, turn stock-jobber, set up a Mississippi Stock, bubble a
nation, and you may soon be a great man; if you have good luck,
according to an old English maxim: Dare once
be a rogue upon
22 1
record, And you may quickly hope to be a Lord.
Projectors. Any number of legitimate schemes were launched,
such as banks, insurance companies, canal projects and the like.
England's commerce was rising but the new-found wealth had its critics.
One critic of the system wrote:
The World of late has run into so many whimsical projects, prithee
for once publish the following to see how they will encourage a good
one.
The Projector, by long Study, has attained a certain method of
melting down Carpenters Chips and Saw-Dust, &c. and running them
into Planks and Boards of all Lengths and Sizes.
Hereby all Gentlemen, Builders and others, may, upon ten Days
Notice, be furnished with Boards and Planks adapted exactly to
Dimensions they want, at least twenty-five percent Cheaper than yet
has been known.
These Boards will be free from Knots and Sap, and delivered grained
or not as desired.
The Projector promises himself, that he shall shortly be able to give
them Tincture of Marble shade, or any other fine Stone Colour....
The Composition in these Boards has a secret virtue which prevents
their shrinking, and destroys all Bugs and Vermine that come near
them.
Proposals for erecting a Company, and raising Joint-Stock of one
Million five hundred thousand pounds, on very advantageous Terms
to subscribers, will be shortly published, and the Projector will be
220. Id.
221. Id. at 292-93.
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glad (in the interim) of an Opportunity to confer with any Gentlemen
of Ingenuity upon so beneficial a Scheme; and for that purpose, will
give daily
Attendance at Exchange Alley, at the Cock in Birchin
22 2
Lane.

Bubbles. These new investment schemes and projects were known
as "bubbles."
Shakespeare employed "bubble reputation." 223 The
Volunteers, or the Stock-Jobbers, a play by Thomas Shadwell (1693),
described men who cheated as "bubbling" each other for profit.224 A
venturer in the new market does not care if the business is reality-based.
"'[B]etween us,' he confides, 'Its no matter whether it turns to use or not;
the main end,
verily, is to turn the Penny in the way of Stock-Jobbing,
22 5
that's all.'"
Stock-jobbing had entered the vocabulary and had many
meanings-ranging from trading in stock to cheating on the trades. 226 By
early 1692, a member of the House of Commons was lamenting that
"[t]he trade of stockjobbing is now become the sole business of227
many
persons, which has ruined great numbers of tradesmen and others.,
By the time of the South Sea Bubble, some financial schemes were
understood by the population to be bubbles, like airy, free-floating soap
bubbles.228 Improbable companies proved the inspiration for "A New
Pack of Bubble Cards., 229 Here is the epigram from the Five of Hearts:
They talk of distant seas, of ships and nets
And with the style of Royal gild their baits;
When all that the projectors hope or wish for 230
Is to catch fools, the only chubs they fish for.
The South Sea Company and its bubble. As documented, the
South Sea Company was an interesting financial institution in the 1710s.
It had failed as a trading company, yet had succeeded in its first ventures
in re-financing some of England's national debt. In 1717, the Company,
which had already increased its capital to 10 million pounds, wanted to

222. BALEN, supra note 87, at 90-91.
223. Id. at 91.
224. STUART BANNER, ANGLO-AMERICAN
POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690-1860, at 25 (1998).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227.

SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL AND

Id. at 26, citing THE PARLIAMENTARY DIARY OF NARCISSUS LUTRELL (Henry

Horwitz ed., 1972).
228. Id. But, alas without their transparency.
229. BALEN, supra note 87, at 92.
230. Id.
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raise an additional 2 million pounds.23' In response, one Member of
Parliament (MP), John Aislabie, argued that:
[O]f late years the companies of monied men are grown so uppish as
not only to tread familiarly with Parliament, but even to pretend to
dictate to it, and that, therefore, it is high time to give them a check,
and let them know that the landed men and their representatives are
the mainspring
and stock of the wealth and strength of the
2 2
Kingdom.
Melville quotes an unknown author who wrote the following in the

OriginalJournalin 1719:
If any of the days of us or our forefathers might be called the
projecting age, I think this is the time.... If ever there was a nation
that had been twenty-three years ruining itself and recovered in a
moment, this is the time. If ever a Government paid its debts without
money, and exchanged all the cash in the kingdom for bits of paper,
which had neither anybody to pay them for, or any intrinsic fund, to
pay themselves, this is the time. If ever a credit was raised without a
foundation, and built up to a height that not only 233
was likely to fall,
but indeed was impossible to stand, this is the time.
The MP's who opposed the Company proposal to solve the National
Debt were led by Walpole, who urged that the Company:
[C]ountenanced the pernicious practice of stock-jobbing, by diverting
the genius of the nation from trade and industry; that it held out a
dangerous lure for decoying the unwary to their ruin by a false
prospect of gain, and to part with the gradual profits of their labour
for imaginary wealth. In vain he insisted that if the proposal of the
South Sea Company should be accepted, the rise of their stock ought
to be limited ....
[I]t was to raise artificially the value of the stock
by exciting and keeping up a general infatuation, and by promoting
dividends out of funds which would not be adequate to the purpose.
In vain he predicted that if the establishment succeeded, the Directors
would become masters of the Kingdom, and control the resolutions of
the Legislature; or234if it did not succeed, the failure would cause a
general discontent.
Other MP's opposed the Company, because it would allow
foreigners to double their money, then withdraw their investment and
take it to other countries. Also, the artificial rise of Company stock
231. See LEWIS MELVILLE, THE SOUTH SEA BUBBLE (1921) [hereinafter MELVILLE].
232. Id. at 24-25.
233. Id. at 34.
234. Id. at 42-43. Compare this with the lament of Waermondt, the moralist, in the
Dialogues, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note 21.
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could "decoy unwary people to their ruin.... 2 3 5 Finally, the Company
was feared to be, due to its enormous capitalization (30 million pounds),
236
too powerful, and might have too much influence in the political arena.
Lord Cowper stated that "'like the Trojan horse was ushered in, and
received with great pomp and
acclamation, but which was contrived for
237
destruction.'"
and
treachery
Lord Sunderland defended the decision, stating that the directors of
the Company would do their best to make money to solve the National
Debt problem, but also had a prospect of private gain. Sunderland
believed that it was reasonable for the directors to profit from sound
management and industry.238
The "Boom" in the Stock of the South Sea Company, April July, 1720. Edward Harley wrote that "'[t]he spirit of stock-jobbing is
rising to a higher degree than ever' in February of 1720.239 Mrs.
Windham wrote that "'ladies sell their jewels to buy [South Sea
Company stock], and happy are they that are in.... 24 0 Charwood
Lawton said that "' [n]obody talks of anything but stocks and South Sea,
and now and then a duel.' 241 Mist's Weekly Journalprinted:
If you are ambitious, you must put on a sword, kill a beau or two, get
into Newgate, be condemned to be hanged, break prison, ifyou canremember that, by the way-get over the water to some strange
country, set up a Mississippi stock, bubble a nation, and you may
soon be a great man.242
This was in response to the sentiment of the French that John Law
"was regarded as the greatest man of the day. 243
During this time, interested parties circulated wild rumors in order
to increase the Company's stock price. "[N]othing was too absurd to be
said, and, presently, nothing was too ridiculous to be believed.",244 Isaac
Newton, when asked about "the continuance of the rising of the stock,
answered that he could not calculate the madness of people. 245
Stock of the South Sea Company Slumps, August - September,
1720. Eustace Budgell, in a statement attempting to lend support to the
235.
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directors during the slump, added that "'but the most artful story, the
most malicious falsehood, that our enemies have given out is, that two or
three of our very Directors, that some of our own body, have basely
betrayed the trust reposed in them, and have been the chief causes of the
present confusions.' 246 He stated that he could not believe that men
who had been "'entrusted with the fortunes of so many of their fellowsubjects, could engage in so base a design.' ' 247 Budgell stated that the
directors could, if they wished and were "wicked, ....
get a great deal of
money at the expense of those who trusted them"' and, if they did, they
would not be "'safe in the enjoyment of it.' ' 248 He only stated this to

"'show how unlikely, how improbable, a falsehood the malice of our
enemies has invented.' '249 This prompted one of the directors, Robert
2 0
Chester, to emphatically rebut the idea suggested by Budgell.
Chester's rebuttal was satisfactory to the public, but the public was
alarmed that none of the other directors took the opportunity to follow
suit, although James Craggs the elder stated that the idea Budgell floated
was a result of the many enemies of the Company as a by-product of
jealousy.25'
The Nation in Distress and Public Outcry, October - November,
1720. The public outcry among the upper and middle classes was
enormous during this financial crisis. The general sense was that of
anger and a desire to punish those responsible for the financial collapse.
"Indeed, no man's reputation was safe, and slander was as busy with the
innocent as with the guilty.

' 252

The directors were unanimously

condemned in the court of public opinion.
Any number of caricatures and newspaper and pamphlet editorials
damned the South Sea Company and its speculators. Even Jonathan
Swift got into the act:
South Sea Project
Directors, thrown into the sea,

Recover strength and vigour there;
But may be tamed another way,
253
Suspended for a while in air.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

supra note 231, at 128.
Id.
Id. at 128-29.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. Swift continues with similar venom for another eight stanzas. Id. at 144.
Swift continues with similar venom for another eight stanzas. Id. at 144.
MELVILLE,
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We end with Alexander Pope, once an enthusiastic speculator,
having buyer's remorse:
The fate of the South-sea Scheme has much sooner than I expected
verfy'd what you told me. Most people thought it wou'd come but no
man prepar'd for it; no man consider'd it would come like a Thief in
the night, exactly as it happens in the case of death. Methinks God
has punish'd the avaritious as he often punishes sinners, in their own
way, in the very sin itself: the thirst for gain was their crime, and that
thirst continued became their punishment and ruin. As for the few
who have the good fortune to remain with half of what they imagined
they had, (among whom is your humble servant) I would have them
sensible of their felicity. ...

They have dreamed out their dream,

and awakening have found nothing in their hands. Indeed the
universal poverty, which is the consequence of universal avarice, and
which will fall hardest upon the guiltless and industrious part of
mankind, is lamentable. The universal deluge of the S. Sea, contrary
to the old deluge, has drowned all except a few Unrighteous men: but
it is some comfort to me that I am2 54
not one of them, even tho' I were
to survive and rule the world by it.
A disasterof biblicalproportionsindeed. Or so it seemed.2 55
V.

BLOODSUCKERS, WIDOWS, ORPHANS AND THE REVOLUTIONARY
WAR DEBT.

Speculation and the Revolutionary War went hand-in-glove.
During the War, the States and national government issued a variety of
debt to finance the struggle. The value of the debt rose and fell with the
fortunes of war.
The Financing of the War (1775-1789). British North America
was not blessed with precious metals. Specie money (gold and silver
coin) was hard to come by and many colonial governments relied upon
fiat money and currency backed by land banks.256 Land banks financed
land sales and backed their currencies with mortgages held by the banks

254. DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST, supra note
CORRESPONDENCE II 53-54 (George Sherburn ed.,

21, at 84-85, citing ALEXANDER
Claredon Press 1956).

POPE,

255. In fact, the downturn following the bubble was average for the English
eighteenth century economy. The collapse fell unevenly on the classes. Many of the
merchants and city financiers were astute enough to close their accounts. "It was the
small speculator, the petty country gentleman or the substantial farmer, jealous of the
gains of his wealthy neighbours, who came late into the game, without experience and
without London advisors, who was likely to lose it all." Julian Hoppit, FinancialCrises
in Eighteenth-century England, 2nd Series XXXIX, 1 ECON. HiST. REV. 39, 48 (1986),
citing E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS 114 (1975).
256. E. JAMES FERGUSON, THE POWER OF THE PURSE 1776-1790 3-4 (The University
of North Carolina Press 1961) [hereinafter THE POWER OF THE PURSE].

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 113:2

and deposits from rural landowners and investors. Land is an illiquid
asset and in times of economic stress when agricultural prices were
depressed, land values fell, as did the value of land bank-based
257
Colonial legislatures were likely to inflate the money supply
currency. 25
by "printing" fiat money. This eased the pain of agrarian debtors as well
258
It also ran the not insubstantial risk of
as kept money in circulation.
debasing the currency.
When the war broke out in 1775, the colonies turned to a mixture of
taxation, fiat money, and government debt to finance the war.2 1 9 As the
fortunes of war turned against the colonists and colonial economies were
ravaged by destruction, its fiat money depreciated and claims paid by fiat
money threatened to become worthless. 260 To field forces and protect the
state, many colonies and sometimes the Continental Congress resorted to
confiscation of war material. 261 The confiscation was, of course,
disguised, as merchants, farmers and vendors were issued Congressional
or state certificates in payment for the vital war goods. With prospects
fragile, these payments differed little from outright confiscation. Such
procurement outraged merchants and farmers, undercutting the very
ideals of the Revolution.262
When the Continental Congress met in 1774, the nation's
government was in terrible financial condition. There was no treasury, no
customs officers, no taxes, and no collectors. To control the revolution
and win the war, Congress would require funds.263 At that time, both the
British officials and state officials claimed the right to tax. For political
reasons, Congress and the states did not want to incur the ire of the
populace by raising onerous taxes.264 Thus, states resorted to loans or the
printing press. By 1780, $241,000,000 in loans had been issued. 265
Loans offered a method of obtaining money without resort to printing it.
But these loans had to be repaid. The interest had to be serviced if the
state was to survive.

257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 8.
EDWIN J.

PERKINS, AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 1700AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE].
WAR
344 (Sourcebooks
GEORGE WASHINGTON'S
CHADWICK,

1815, at 43 (Ohio State University Press 1994) [hereinafter
261. BRUCE
Incorporated 2004).
262. Id. at 347.
263. WILLIAM G.

ANDERSON, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, THE PUBLIC DEBT OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 3 (University Press of Virginia 1983) [hereinafter THE PRICE OF
LIBERTY].

264.
265.

Id.
In 1775, £6 million was advanced to the Congress for gunpowder. Id. at 6.
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The National Debt. By 1779-1780 the Continental currency had
collapsed. Congress began to issue certificates.266 By 1780 these
certificates were almost a total loss. 2 6 7 The national government was
reluctant to redeem them.
Nevertheless, these almost-worthless
certificates could be used in payment for each state's tax requisition. 268
Quartermasters used them for supplies but they were virtually
worthless. The military often resorted to impressments "legal robbery
qualified by9 a promissory note"-to obtain grain, cattle and other
provisions.

26

By 1790, Alexander Hamilton estimated that the national debt of the
Continental Congress and the Confederation was about $54 million.27 °
The Foreign Debt. In addition to loans to the Congress and state
loans, the new nation turned to foreign nations and their capital markets
for loans. Continental currency, while it was just meeting domestic
needs, could not be used for foreign debt.2 7' With the victory of
Saratoga, the French openly lent to the United States sums totaling 18
million livres tournes, representing 21 loans.272 These loans were
contracted to be repaid at 5 percent in 1782.273 The French also enabled
the Americans to obtain credit from the Dutch, guaranteeing 10 million
livres of Dutch loans in 1781.274 In 1782 John Adams obtained 5 million
275
guilders at 5 percent and an additional 800,000 at 4 percent.
27 6
Foreign debt in 1790 was approximately $10.5million.
The State Debt.
The states "had voluntarily shouldered
approximately 60 percent of the aggregate military expenditures from
1775 to 1783, with Congress assuming most of the remaining debts
totaling $18 million by 1790. ",277 States initially used paper money to
fund the war effort. As runaway inflation ruined state credit they
resorted to borrowing, the bulk of it in state certificates. In 1780,

266.
267.

Id.at 11.
Id. at 12.

268. Id.
269.

Id. at ll.

270. DONALD R. STABILE, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE: DEBATES
OVER MONEY, DEBT, AND TAXES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA, 1776-1836, 104

(Greenwood Press 1998).
271. THE POWER OF THE PURSE, supra note 256, at 31.
272. Prior to Saratoga, the French had given material and support disguised as
commercial transactions. Id. at 45.
273. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, supra note 263, at 5.
274. JOHN STEELE GORDON, HAMILTON'S BLESSING: THE EXTRAORDINARY LIFE AND
TIMES OF OUR NATIONAL DEBT 12 (Walker Publishing 1997) [hereinafter HAMILTON'S
BLESSING].
275. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, supra note 263, at 5.

276.

AMERICANPUBLICFINANCE,supra note 260, at 101.

277.

Id. at 138.
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Congress asked the states to issue certificates to compensate their
troops.278 During the 1780s the chief expense of the state governments
was debt service.
The use of debt to finance the war varied by region. The northern
states relied on loans and taxes. 279 The southern states, with capital tied
up in slaves and land, and overrun by the British, relied on paper money
and the confiscation of Tory estates to pay the debts. 280 By 1785, many
of the original holders of the debt had transferred their certificates to
merchants, money brokers, and commercial farmers, so great was their
need for specie. This transfer of certificates led to cries of "shame" and
"bloodsucker" at the speculators who preyed upon widows, orphans,
farmers, and war veterans.281
Into this heady mix of default and
desperation was added the threat of insurrection by debtors when Daniel
Shay and his followers rebelled in western Massachusetts. The rebellion
was quickly suppressed. But fears of the wealthy persisted-fears that
the government could not deal with the economy and that insurrections
might become more common.
These fears pushed the wealthy
commercial classes toward a strong, central government with
considerable economic powers.
Robert Morris and the Debt. In February 1781, Robert Morris,
America's most prominent and respected financier and Superintendent of
Finance for the Confederation, demanded control of expenditures and the
right to settle the public accounts. 282 Morris was a nationalist. He
believed the radical Articles arrangement of Congressional power
crippled effective government. He had little sympathy for the radical
tradition of the agrarians and was tied to the rising power of the
merchants. He, and other moderates like Hamilton, wanted the nation to
rise to "power, consequence, grandeur., 283 Morris wanted the national
government to foster business enterprise. He thought the United States
should copy the British model of public finance.284 He believed that
America 5 would transcend to a continental power if it adopted such a
28
policy.
In a message to Congress in 1782, Morris advised that if the debt
were treated properly, the value of securities would rise, and funds flow
"into those hands which would render it most productive."' 286 He desired
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, supra note 263, at 23.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28-29.
AMERicAN PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 260, at 107.
THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, supra note 263, at 14.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
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a revitalized system of currency and credit. "A due provision for the
public debts would convert at once those debts into a real medium of
commerce." 287 He was proposing liquefying the debt, the tool the Bank
of England used to great effect as it stoked the fires of trade and
commerce in the British Empire.
The conservatives and moderates wanted to get the debt into the
hands of the merchants so that they could leverage the economy and the
nation's fortunes.
A public debt supported by public revenue, will prove the strongest
cement to keep our confederacy together. Sound policy would also
dictate that we should do justice to those who have trusted us, in
order that we may have.., credit in the future. We might, then, tax
the present race of citizens at six pounds instead of a hundred and
leave posterity to pay the principal.
The radicals had other plans for the onerous debt-debt relief!
Radicals wanted to reduce the debt quickly and at the cheapest cost
(devaluation, payment at market value, and restructuring come to
mind). 289 Radicals and their agrarian allies wanted to treat the original
holders "fairly" (by discriminating against the speculators).
Undeterred, Morris continued to push for consolidating the national
debt by offering his program for consolidation of $27 million. 290 By now
the states had assumed some of the national debt. This was due to the
fact that the Confederation could not pass a revenue bill unless all states
agreed. Hence, some of the states took assumption into their own
hands. 291 This state assumption and repayment (often with devalued
currency or modification) threatened national unity by making the states
more powerful and the union less important in fiscal matters.2 92 Another
scheme put forth by some of the public creditors was that federal
certificates (almost worthless) could be used to purchase western lands.
Morris objected to this scheme, as the land sales would not have been
sufficient to fund the debt. 293 He wanted to preserve the national debt to

make the federal government supreme because to honor the debt would
mean permanent federal taxes.294 The power of the purse would control
the economy and the nation.
287. Id.
288.

Id. at 15-16 (quoting CURTIs

NETTELS, THE EMERGENCE

ECONOMY, 1775-1815, at 33 (New York Press 1963)).
289. THE PRICE OF LIBERTY, supra note 263, at 21.
290. Id. at 17.
291. Id. at21.
292. See id.
293. Id. at 20.
294. Id.
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In 1784 Rhode Island was the straw that broke the camel's back.
Rhode Island, a trading and debtor state, held out and refused to accede
to a modest impost bill to fund Confederation expenses and to pay some
of the interest in arrears.29 5 From 1784 the Confederation was doomed.
It could not raise revenue. It could not pay its debts. It could not protect
its settlers from the Indian tribes. It could not obtain advantageous
commercial treaties with the British, its major trading partner. It could
not dislodge the British from their western forts at Niagara and Detroit.
The Confederation was bankrupt-fiscally and politically. America had
come to the fork in the road. 296
The New Federal Government. The Confederation's impotence
was palpable. The Confederation was powerless to rescue America from
its debt and weakness. The Annapolis Convention of 1786 was a last
ditch attempt to rescue the Confederation by amending its economic
powers. 297 The Annapolis Convention failed but it laid the groundwork
for the 1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. 298
The
Philadelphia convention wrote the Constitution. Its ratification offered
the hope of fiscal salvation, national unity and power. The federal
republic was born when New York and Virginia ratified the Constitution
in 1788, ending the question of disunion. 299 Rhode Island held out and
ratified in 1790.300 The new government came into being with the
election of
the First Congress and George Washington as the first
301

president.

The Debt was the most urgent problem facing the nation, like the
Confederation before it. Hamilton estimated the national debt to be
about $40 million.3 °2 Also
owed was $25 million in state debt and $11.6
30 3
million in foreign debt.

It was a staggering $76 million according to the new treasury's best
data.30 4 By any standard, the debt beggared the imagination. The new

295.

See id.

296. Which is after all what the radicals fought against in the Revolution. To give
important fiscal and economic powers to a strong national government seemed to turn the
Revolution upside down.
297. See FORREST MCDONALD, STATES' RIGHTS AND THE UNION, IMPERIUM IN
IMPERIO, 1776-1876, at 14 (Lance Banning & Wilson Carey McWilliams eds., University
Press of Kansas 2000).
298. See id. at 15.
299. See id. at 22.
300. Id. at 22.
301. AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 260, at 213.
302. Id.
303. JOHN FERLING, A LEAP IN THE DARK: THE STRUGGLE TO CREATE THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 315 (Oxford University Press 2003).
304. Id. at 316; see also WILLARD STERNE RANDALL, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A LIFE
389-90 (2003) [hereinafter ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A LIFE] (discussing the
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government would have to solve the debt problems or the Revolution
would fail.
Unlike the British, the United States did not have one of the world's
most sophisticated economies. It would be a gamble to stake the future
of the nation on solving the debt problem. The British national debt had
grown from £16.7 million to £272 million in about 100 years. 30 5 During
this period of time the English had grown wealthy and became a great
power. The British had developed capital markets like the London Stock
Exchange and the banks in the City. These markets were supported by
the "open market operations" of the Bank of England.30 6 In contrast,
America had nascent capital markets (speculation in the national debt in
cities like New York and Philadelphia) and no national banking
system. °7 The United States had only five tiny banks in New York,
Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Providence. 30 8
The banks'
combined capital was $3 million; these banks were incapable of
providing critical financial services like clearing accounts easily and
lending to governments. 30 9 The American financial system was
rudimentary, to say the least. While poised on the cusp of the Industrial
Revolution, the American banking system and "capital markets" were
incapable of sustaining rapid industrial, technological and commercial
0
31

change.

It was a gamble worth taking because of the strength of Hamilton's
plan, turning the debt into a perpetual fund or annuity like the British
system. This would allow the Republic to grow without the threat of
bankruptcy.
Hamilton's expense budget showed a deficit of about
$1.5 million. 3"1 This could only be met by refunding the debt, borrowing
new monies, and paying a lower rate of interest. 31 2 Congress and the
Treasury focused on the national debt, debt incurred by the Continental
Congress and under the Articles first.
Funding of the National Debt and the Discrimination Problem.
There was general agreement that the federal government should be
Confederation debt in 1790 could be broken down as follows: national debt to foreign
states and nationals was $11,710,378; domestic debt (principal and interest) was
$44,440,085; state debt was estimated to be about $25 million).
305. HAMILTON'S BLESSING, supra note 274, at 1-2.

306. The Bank of England both supported the debt, keeping interest rates low, and
issued banknotes, assuring the nation adequate liquidity for commerce and growth.
307.
308.
309.
310.
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311.
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312.
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responsible for all national debt incurred in prosecuting the war.313 There
was no serious consideration of defaulting, threatening to default,
devaluing the currency, or restructuring the foreign debt. The $11.6
million owed to France, Holland and foreign nationals would be honored
at face value and at the stated interest rate. 314 When that decision was
made, the value of these securities was restored as foreign governments
and investors now trusted the new government's credit. The value in the
securities rose in cities like New York and Philadelphia, as well as cities
abroad, because
there was an active market for $43 million in United
315
debt.
States
Speculation arose and speculators became active in both national
and state debt owed to Americans. These speculators enjoyed a nasty
reputation and were commonly thought of as blood-suckers by AntiFederalists, agrarians, rural debtors, and states' right advocates.3 16 They
did not make their reputations shine when, on rumors of federal action to
refund the debt, moneyed men from urban areas went to the back woods
in search of cheap, highly discounted debt. To make matters worse,
Duer, Hamilton's assistant at the Treasury, and a number of
Congressmen sent their representatives to the hinterlands to buy up the
discounted obligations.31 7 The Georgians and North Carolinians in
Congress were particularly hostile to these activities. While Hamilton
was without reproach, rumors circulated about his inside profits. Anger
welled up as reports filtered back to New York about the egregious
behavior of the speculators. Many in Congress were willing to redeem
the domestic portion of the national debt; however, they wanted to
discriminate between the good, original holders, and the less worthy,
subsequent holders who appeared to have been involved in speculation
and were taking untoward advantage of the naYve and distressed.318
The evils of speculation were exaggerated then and have been in
many historical accounts of the discrimination issue. 319 The long and
short of it was that the speculation involved speculators and very few
widows and orphans were forced to sell. Debt had been trading for about
313.

AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE,

supra note 260, at 213.

314. Seeid. at 315.
315. Wall Street, like the London Stock Exchange, was to be founded by investors
trading in national debt and state debt. As businesses required more capital, these bonds
could be used by banks and investors to fund the projects.
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317. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A LIFE, supra note 304, at 392.
318. See AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 260, at 222.
319. This exaggeration probably occurred because the press and politicians, echoing
common wisdom, were so often vitriolic. However, when common sense is applied to
the debt and the principles of speculation, it is apparent that brave James Madison,
Thomas Jefferson, and their supporters got it wrong.
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fifteen years so that when compounding of interest and discounting to net
present value are considered, those who parted with the debt at an earlier
time were in approximately the same economic situation as those who
bought the discounted paper.32 °
"Debt certificates issued to soldiers and military suppliers were seen
as obligations likely to claim a second call on congressional coffers, and
they traded at lower prices than bonds." 321 The original holders sold
quickly to secondary investors as the original lenders had little use for
financial instruments with an undetermined maturity date.3 22 These
original holders had an immediate need for cash for consumption or
tangible assets such as land, tools, etc.323 Sellers in the early and mid1780s received very low sums for the debt instruments. 324 The debts
were extremely risky-they had no maturity dates and Congress was
unable to pay even interest. 325 Present value theory states that money
presently received is always valued more than future payments as the
326
money can be reinvested to earn interest.
[W]ere the original holders of government securities who sold out to
secondary investors unduly exploited and thus entitled to additional
compensation in 1790? Most modem financial analysts would argue
in the negative-opposing Madison [and Jefferson] and supporting
Hamilton. Let us assume that on average sellers of certificates
received about twenty-five cents on the dollar from 1783 to 1785.
For example, the soldier who received $25 for certificates with a face
value of $100 in 1784 had the use of that money for seven more years
than the investor who was forced to wait until the resumption of
interest payments in 1791. If the soldier invested the money in
productive assets that returned 8 percent compounded annually, by
1791 the proceeds from that sale would have climbed steadily in
value to about $43. Meanwhile, the investor in the soldier's
certificates received no interest payments or any other form of
remuneration during those same seven years.... Overall, it seems
fair to conclude that in most instances the actual profits realized on
speculative investments were a far cry from the exaggerated
multiples alleged by Madison and his supporters.

320. Had the United States lost the war in 1780 (as it might very well have), the
widow who sold her paper to the Pennsylvanian speculator at $.20 on the dollar during
the dark days at Valley Forge would have had $.20 on the dollar, while the speculator had
nothing for his money.
321. AMERICAN PUBLIC FINANCE, supra note 260, at 226.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 227.
325. See id.
326. Id.
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Madison pointed to an allegedly gross inequity between the financial
returns realized by original holders of federal debt instruments who
sold prematurely and the returns of secondary investors who held to
1790. However, modem techniques have narrowed that gap-and
perhaps even eliminated it altogether, depending on varying
assumptions about the profit and risk expectations associated with
investments in the federal debt and other forms of productive assets
in the mid-1780s. Madison erred on two accounts. First, like many
of his contemporaries unaccustomed to analyzing financial data (plus
many people in the late twentieth century as well), he failed to
consider fully differences in the timing of financial returns.
Secondly, most of the trading in government securities in 1789 and
1790 occurred among secondary holders themselves. Some decided
to take their profits on federal certificates, which had risen, for
example from thirty cents on the dollar in 1789 up to the fifty-percent
level in 1790. Numerous prudent investors feared that political
lower the
rivalries might delay actual funding for several more years,
327
final interest rates, or even produce partial repudiation.
Indeed, speculators are quite useful economic creatures as they
provide liquidity in markets. As bad as the discounts were during the
darkest days of the war, the liquidity provided by the speculators was
supporting the war bonds and certificates by providing a market for
investors. They were playing a role similar to vulture capitalists in
modem corporate bankruptcies, providing support for the bond market of
the distressed company. The nation and the states would have been
much worse off if the trading had been suspended to stop the
speculators-then the market really would have fallen to the center of the
world!
A related problem to the refunding of the domestic national debt at
face value was that some states, like Pennsylvania, had for some time
been buying up national debt and redeeming it.328 If this activity
continued, the nation would be less reliant upon the central government
to cure economic ills. Hence, it was important to nationalists, like
Hamilton and Morris, to end the state purchase programs.
Added to the mix was sectional politics. The refunding of the
national debt would take federal revenues and funnel it to urban areas,
which Hamilton supported because the debt could then become active
capital and fund commerce and industry. 329 This would reduce the
importance of rural states and agrarian communities. To a very real

327.
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extent the South and West were pitted against the New England and the
Middle Atlantic states.
Before the First Congress was elected, Madison seemed to be the
logical Virginian choice for the Senate. However, his nationalism cost
him and the state electors denied him the Senate. Madison then stood for
election as a representative and was elected. He soon became the leader
of the new body of representatives and a power broker with which the
administration needed to deal.
Madison's thwarted senatorial aspirations undoubtedly caused him
to mend fences. In The FederalistPapers,Madison had argued for nondiscrimination. As the leader of the Virginian delegation he switched
positions as many Virginians wanted discrimination. They had seen first
hand speculators in their backyards buying up the debt. Virginians also
feared the growth of commercial cities33 ° and the loss of "planter power."
Thus, Madison opposed the funding bills, in opposition to his friend and
former ally, Hamilton.3 3 Madison came around in the Compromise of
1790 that resolved several of the nation's most difficult problems.3 32
The Assumption Battle and the Compromise of 1790.
Incorporating the assumption of the state debt and deciding the location
of the capital city were critical decisions in the nation's history and
perhaps its most important Compromise. The resolution of the debt issue
and the nettlesome location of the capital strengthened the union and the
economy. Had they been resolved differently, forces of disunion might
have threatened the new nation. Happily, Congress passed legislation
assuming the state debt at face value and approved the new locations for
the capital-ten years in Philadelphia followed by permanent relocation
333
to the banks of the Potomac-which favored the South and West.
Tied in with the non-discrimination issue was whether the state
debt, totaling about $21.5 million, was to be assumed by the federal
government.3 34 Hamilton's plans called for the assumption to treat all
creditors with parity and make available more collateral for the bankissue currency he was planning for the nation.335 The assumption issue
did not break down along sectional lines. Some states in the North
favored it; others opposed it. The same was true for the South. The
division broke along the lines of states who had repaid the debt and those
that did not. Debtor states would be bailed out by a federal windfall,

330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Madison, along with Jefferson and Monroe, hated urban areas.
See THE POWER OF THE PURSE, supra note 256, at 314.
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funded by those good states that had reduced or paid off the debt. 336 The
truth was a different matter; many of the states had reduced their debt by
repayment with devalued currency or restructured obligations. Virginia
fell into that camp. Virginians would also pay excise taxes on northern
goods and imposts to pay the debt. They correctly foresaw a capital
transfer to northern mercantile areas.
The location of the capital was also to be determined. The Southern
states wanted it moved from urban New York with its influence of filthy
lucre from commerce to a southern or more central location.
Philadelphia was hankering for the permanent capital. Pennsylvanians
also proposed locating the capital on the Susquehanna near present-day
Harrisburg, the state capital. Some wanted it at the fall of the Delaware
(Trenton, New Jersey). Southerners held out for a more southern
location. Pennsylvanians and Virginians were willing to trade votes if
they got what they wanted.337 A deal was in the air and a number of
proposals were floating at the time of the historic dinner.
The Compromise would solve three issues: the discrimination
issue, the assumption of state debt, and the capital location. Several
Virginians whose districts bordered the Potomac switched their votes, as
did some Congressmen from Pennsylvania. 338 The Congress approved
Philadelphia for the temporary capital for 10 years. The permanent
location was the District of Columbia, in the South. The Pennsylvanians
got the opportunity to convince the government to stay in Philadelphia.
The South was awarded the new capital, in the wilderness near
Washington's home at Mount Vernon. The union was strengthened by
the Compromise as the South received its recognition as host of the new
capital. Interested creditors were aligned to the federal government's
fisc. Hamilton got his assumption and consolidation of the debt. Once
the bills were passed, the value of the securities traded at parevidencing confidence in the new government's fiscal plans and
prospects for survival.339
Conclusion. Misunderstanding abounds concerning the bloodsucking speculators in Revolutionary War debt. While there was much
speculation in war debt, the reasons for the speculation were the fortune
of war and the weakness of the securities. Popular wisdom has it that
soldiers and suppliers received pennies on the dollar while sharpies
reaped huge profits. The data supports that many holders of debt sold
early when the War was not going well and that the "profiteers" reaped

336.
337.
338.
339.

Id. at 307.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Id. at 329.
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their reward many years later. When time value of money and risk is
taken into account and understood, it can be seen that the speculators
earned reasonable returns for their risks while providing much-needed
liquidity to the wartime economy.
VI. THE WILD RIDE OF THE ROBBER BARONS-SPECULATION AND
RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION. 3 4 °

A common picture of the Gilded Age is one of Robber Barons
exacting the last iota of wealth from Americans. In his 1962 Foreword to
The Robber Barons: The Great American Capitalists 1862-1901,
Matthew Josephson describes Robber Barons in the following manner:
Those "kings" of railways, those monopolists of iron or pork,
moreover founded dynastic families which Charles A. Beard once
likened to old ducal families of feudal England.
The expanding America of the post-Civil war era was a paradise of
freebooting capitalists, untrammeled and untaxed. They demanded
always a free hand in the market, promising that in enriching
themselves
they would "build up the country" for the benefit of all
34 1
people.

The Robber Baron image persists to this day and suggests that the
nineteenth century capital markets were gamed to the detriment of
society. This common wisdom belies the creation of the infrastructure
that was the foundation of twentieth century America's gigantic and
successful economy. Josephson's image of these moguls is not only
inapposite, it is grossly erroneous. The robber barons of yore preyed
upon travelers in mountain passes and exacted their unjust tolls. They
were thugs, profiting from their seizure of the high ground. They were
rent-seekers with pikes and battleaxes. American Robber Barons cut the
mountain passes, dug canals, and dredged waterways, building a modem
national infrastructure. This infrastructure unified the nation and created
340.

Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Christian C. Day,

Investor Power & Liquidity: Corporations,CapitalMarkets and the Industrialization of

America, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 345 (2001) [hereinafter Day, Investor Power
& Liquidity]. For an excellent discussion of comers in the emerging United States
market and illiquidity that follows them, see generally Franklin Allen, Lubomir P. Litov
& Jianping Mei, Large Investors, Price Manipulation, and Limits to Arbitrage: An
Anatomy of Market Comers (Dec. 30, 2004), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/
abstract=604302.
341.

MATTHEW

JOSEPHSON,

THE

ROBBER

BARONS:

THE

GREAT

AMERICAN

CAPITALISTS 1862-1901 v. (3rd Harcourt Brace Janovich 1962 ). So that there can be no
doubt about the industrialist, the title page quotes Francis Bacon: "There are never
wanting some persons of violent and undertaking natures, who, so they may have power
and business, will take it at any costs." Id.
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a national economy linked to the global economy of the nineteenth
century. These "plunderers" also built the manufacturing plants, the
mills, and the emporiums for the hungry consumers. In the post-Civil
War era their raw capitalism fostered an industrial giant that created
enormous national wealth and dramatically raised American living
standards.
The nineteenth century saw massive investment in the United
States, tremendous growth of businesses and capital stock, and an
increase in the nation's wealth.
The American investment capital market developed in a form very
similar to that of the European system, not only because Americans
copied the Europeans, especially the British, but also because the
European system served as a template. If the Americans wanted to
borrow European finance capital, they would have to offer bonds and
other securities similar to those on the European markets. They would
have to deal with investment bankers like the Rothschilds or the Barings
and conform to the requirements that these conservative bankers
proposed.342
Financial institutions were one key to this transformational
growth.34 3 Foreign capital became important in the 1830s. By 1853,
approximately $222 million was due to foreign capital investments (19%
of American securities).34 4 By 1856, the Secretary of the Treasury
345
estimated that foreign investment in railroads amounted to $83 million.
After 1850,346 railroads were:
[A]ble to raise substantial sums in the European market, and the bulk
of foreign investment came after the Civil War. To raise large sums
of capital, which reached millions of dollars per enterprise, railroad
342. See WILLIAM G. Roy, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
In America,
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 136 (Princeton University Press 1997).
monitoring and trust arising from investment relationships were similar to English
practices. See generally Julian R. Franks, Colin Mayer, & Stefano Rossi, Ownership:
Evolution and Regulation (ECGI, Finance Working Paper No. 09/2003, 2006), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-354381 [hereinafter Franks]. Franks, Mayer and Rossi
surmised that the dispersed ownership in the English markets was protected by informal
regulation. "Modem" securities regulation was not introduced until well into the
twentieth century, yet English capital markets thrived and provided sufficient safety for
the dispersed shareholders.
343. Banks, trust companies, insurance companies, investment banks, and brokerages
were key intermediaries in the financial markets. Their concurrent development played a
major role in the development of America's capital markets.
344. See JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 71 (Random House 1999)
[hereinafter MORGAN].
345. Id.
346. In the 1850s, railroad investments totaled 6.8% of domestic capital stock; by
1860, they totaled 12.7%. See COLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION:
EARLY RAILROADS IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA 35 (1994).
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promoters ... turned mainly to ... merchant-capitalists (in the
United States), who were often to be found among the ranks of their
own stockholders. The companies relied on these private capitalists
to help them in placing railroad stocks and bonds, which ... were the
first industrial securities to be offered publicly in large volume.
Indeed, they were virtually the only ones until the last decades of the
nineteenth century: ... in the United States, it was only in the 1890s
347
that manufacturers turned to the stock exchange for outside funds.
The rise of national banks and a financial system that exported
capital to regions and industries that used it wisely aided development.
The transfer of funds from the capital-rich East to the West contributed
to the growth of modem America. Railroads bound the nation together
and spurred the growth of great metropolises such as New York and
Chicago. The urbanization of great cities further accelerated economic
348
growth and wealth creation as they supported specialization of work.
The capital transfer helped to meet the demand for tools, housing,
communication works, and other infrastructure needs.349
Of all the burgeoning American industries, railroads profited from
economies of scale, but they required high maintenance and high capital
costs. 350 The tremendous financial needs of the railroads mandated
public equity markets.1 And, the markets had to be regular or investors
35
would be scared off.
347.
348.

Id. at 34-35.
For a good history of this rail-driven urban growth, see SARAH H. GORDON,

PASSAGE To UNION: How THE RAILROAD TRANSFORMED AMERICAN LIFE, 1829-1929,

267-301 (Ivan R. Dee 1990).
349.

See STUART W. BRUCHEY, ENTERPRISE: THE DYNAMIC ECONOMY OF A FREE

PEOPLE 312 (Harvard University Press 1990).
350. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE SCARLET WOMAN OF WALL STREET: JAY GOULD,
JIM FISK, CORNELIUS VANDERBILT, THE ERIE RAILWAY WARS AND THE BIRTH OF WALL
STREET 124 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1988) [hereinafter ERIE RAILWAY WARS]. Railroad

stocks were also good for Wall Street. By 1856, there were 360 railroad stocks traded,
985 bank stocks, hundreds of corporate stocks and municipals, as well as 75 insurance
stocks. See JOHN STEELE GORDON, THE GREAT GAME: THE EMERGENCE OF WALL STREET
AS A WORLD POWER 1653-2000, 87 (Schribner 1999) [hereinafter THE GREAT GAME].

The variety of investments permitted diversification and increased liquidity and safety,
ultimately lowering the cost of capital. See generally Day, Investor Power & Liquidity,
supra note 340.
351. In the period before the Civil War, many stocks, including industrials, were
owned and traded locally. See Hugh Rockoff, Banking and Finance, 1789-1914, in THE
CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. II., THE LONG NINETEENTH

CENTURY 679 (Cambridge University Press 2000). Regional and local stock exchanges,
trading in local companies sufficed for most industrial needs Bankers and securities
dealers in their localities sold new issues. This worked well for the moderate capital
needs before railroad construction. See CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY

72-73 (Oxford University Press 1997). England, of course, had a number of regional
exchanges. There, local knowledge was crucial in vetting companies for new issues. See
Franks, supra note 342, at 17-18.
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The Erie Railway Wars. Few protections existed for minority
shareholders in railroad corporations. 352 "Not only did control groups
quickly form, but in some cases the objective of these blockholders was
primarily to manipulate the stock price of their corporation. 3 53 Professor
Coffee cites the example of the battle
for control of the Erie Railroad35 4
the "Scarlet Lady of Wall Street.
The Erie Railway Wars were emblematic of the legal, moral, and
financial chaos of the times and in the markets.355 The battle for control
of the Albany and Susquehanna (a road linking Binghamton to the
Albany gateway to New England) at the annual board of directors'
election featured Cornelius Vanderbilt and his allies against Jay Gould,
Jim Fisk, and their associates. A young J. P. Morgan advised the New
York Central faction (Vanderbilt's forces). Shareholders, lawyers,
employees, proxy holders, process servers, and thugs attended the
meeting. The company treasurer was arrested for stealing the
subscription books. After papers were served and two separate elections
held, each with a different victor, the battle moved to the courts. Morgan
had the case tried in the friendly confines of Delhi, NY, not Albany or
New York City, and the trial judge ruled in his favor on all counts. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision in its entirety, except
on the critical issue of who had won the election. 356 Grievous harm had
352. During this time period English company law also failed to protect minority
shareholders. See Franks, supra note 343, at 12. Franks et al. cite two important cases:
Foss v. Harbottle, 67 E.R. 189 (1843) (English reports) (restricting minority shareholder
suits for damages) and Harben v. Phillips, 23 Ch.D. 14 (1883) (Chancery Decisions) (no
common law right for proxy voting). Both decisions would make it difficult for minority
shareholders to vindicate their rights.
353. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Role of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 1, 27 (2001)
[hereinafter The Rise of DispersedOwnership].
354. See id. at 27-28. For other sources, see Jay Gould's contemporary, CHARLES
FRANcIS ADAMS, JR., CHAPTERS OF ERIE (1871) [hereinafter CHAPTERS OF ERIE]. See also
ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 350; MAURY KLEIN, THE LIFE AND LEGEND OF JAY
GOULD 77-98 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1986) [hereinafter JAY GOULD]. While
Jay Gould was generally thought of as a villain by most, his control of the Erie was
salubrious, however. Before Gould, the physical plant was run-down and the debt was
staggering. Gould's astute management rendered the Erie a much stronger property. See
JAY GOULD, supra, at 88-102, 115-16, 119-21.
355. Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Christian C. Day,
Partner to Plutocrat: The Separation of Ownership from Management in Emerging
CapitalMarket-19th Century Industrial America, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 525, 560-64
(2004) [hereinafter Partnerto Plutocrat].
356. The Susquehanna War litigation was both complex and protracted. People v.
Albany & Susquehanna R.R. Co., 7 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 265, 38 How. Pr. 228, 1 Lans. 308, 55
Barb. 344 (1869). Smith, J., sustained the election of the Ramsey board (Vanderbilt/
Morgan-backed) and disallowed the election of the Church board (Fisk/Gould-backed) on
the grounds of fraud. The Fisk directors appealed Judge Smith's decision. The General
Term of the Supreme Court sustained the Ramsey Board election and vacated much of
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been done. Jeremiah Black, a former Attorney General of the United
States, wrote:
A moment's attention to this will... show that the confusion,
misapprehension, and total failure ofjustice which took place in these
cases, while they could not possibly have happened in any other
country, could scarcely have been avoided in New York... all
parties were fighting under the ensign of public authority. It was
judicial power subverting order and breaking the peace; it was law on
in one word, it was the New
a rampage; it was justice bedeviled;
357
York Code in full operation.
Harper's Weekly intoned on point that the judiciary must be reformed:
If scenes of anarchy are to be avoided, if New York is to retain its
preeminence as the commercial metropolis of the country, if foreign
capital is to be retained here, something must be done to prevent, in
into which certain of our
the future, the unseemly abuses of power 358
state judges have been betrayed in the past.
Thuggery did not end with the Susquehanna War. Consider the
plight of foreign investors with the audacity to entertain lawsuits in New
York to enforce their rights. English shareholders, who owned 450,000
of the 780,000 shares issued and outstanding (and hence, control of the
company in a society ruled by law), were purposely prevented from
voting for their slate of directors in the 1870 board election. Gould's
forces won by a landslide vote of 304,938 to 3,000! 3 59 The English
shareholders then went to both state and federal court to overturn the
fraudulent election. In July 1871, a year after they began their odyssey,
360
the investors obtained a federal district court judgment in their favor.
the Smith decision on technical grounds dealing with the right to a jury trial and costs.
People v. Albany & S.R. Co., 5 Lans. 25 (N.Y.Sup.Gen.Term 1871). All parties resorted
to the Court of Appeals, which eventually sustained the Smith finding of fraudulent
conduct by the Fisk/Gould faction. Albany & Susquehanna, 57 N.Y. 161 (1874). The
Susquehanna Wars litigation had come to an end, almost as an anticlimax.
The defeat of Fisk and Gould in the 1869 Supreme Court litigation left the Ramsey
board in control. In February 1870 it leased the railroad to the Hudson & Delaware
Canal Company (the predecessor to the Delaware & Hudson Railroad), ending the ability
of the Erie to mount a challenge at the New York Central's Albany gateway. See
CHAPTERS OF THE ERIE, supra note 354, at 190.
357. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 350, at 252 n.23 (citing Jeremiah S. Black,
untitled article, GALAXY MAGAZINE, March, 1872).
358. Id. at 252-53, 253 n.24 (citing Harper's Weekly (Feb. 12, 1870)).
359. Id. at 299-300. At the time, Gould and his allies controlled the Erie. They
accepted the money from the English investors, but never officially transferred the stock
on the company's books to the investors or their representatives, leaving them without the
right to vote in the election.
360. There are four federal cases in this critical litigation to vindicate the rights of
English shareholders. The key case, Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, et al., 8 F. Cas. 762
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However, they had to wait until December 1871, after yet another
fraudulent election, before Gould would finally be compelled to turn
over the stock to them. This battle cost the investors $25,000 and the
loss of control for well over a year. Foreign investors also turned to the
corrupt legislature,361 which refused to repeal the Classification Act,362
ostensibly because of the threat of foreign ownership.36 3
Such
shenanigans surely depressed stock prices, harmed all investors, and
raised the cost of capital.
In the absence of any federal regulations, different laws and judicial
rulings from separate states often came into conflict with one another,
"but the real point is that investors were vulnerable less because of the
substantive inadequacy of American corporate law itself than because of
the lack of enforcement mechanisms and the prospect of corruption. 364
Thus, in the nineteenth century, it was very difficult for investors to
enforce their contract rights through litigation (or even lobbying for
regulation).365 The transaction costs of a Londoner or San Franciscan
(S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 4514), was decided in July 1871 and ordered Gould's agents to
register the stock certificates in the names of their English owners, giving them the
franchise. Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, et al., 8 F. Cas. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 4513), was a
mandamus action ordering Gould's agents to produce the stock transfer book and other
corporate records. Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, et al., 8 F. Cas. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No.
4515), denied the petition of Gould's agents for control of unregistered stock certificates.
Finally, Erie R.R. Co. v. Heath, et al., 8 F. Cas. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1871) (No. 4516), ordered
payment to the master for supervising recording of stock certificates in the names of their
rightful owners.
361. In the Gilded Age, New York legislators were paid the princely sum of $3.00 per
day. These Solons supplemented their salary by taking bribes to pass legislation. The
rate on important bills ranged between $2,000 and $3,000. ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra
note 350, at 185. Bribes were the only way to do business with such a corrupt legislature
and legislation was required for railroad charters and key amendments to charters, such as
additional routes, etc.
362. The Erie Classification Act of 1869 was enacted to make it difficult to dislodge
directors by shareholder vote. The act provided for classification of directors into five
groups, staggering their election over five years. See JAY GOULD, supra note 354, at 98.
(Modem practice permits only three tiers of classification. Management still employs
classified boards to thwart hostile takeovers.)
Gould's inspiration was the Pennsylvania classification act, created to rebuff his
attack on the Pennsylvania Railroad. The Erie Classification Act perpetuated Gould's
control at a time when the legislature was poised to remove its stock printing privileges
that had been employed to great success in the past. See ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra
note 350, at 228, 230.
363. Id. at 299-300.
364. The Rise of DispersedOwnership,supra note 353, at 28.
365. Domestically the nation witnessed a rapid acceleration of the trend to economic
concentration that had begun after the Civil War. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE

SUPREME COURT 103(Knopf new ed. 2001). In the last third of the nineteenth century the
corporation emerged as the dominant form of industrial organization in the United States,
so that by 1890, 65% of the goods manufactured in the country were turned out by
corporations, and by 1900, 79% were. Id. At the same time that the percentage of
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litigating in New York or Boston were steep. There was also a
substantial "home court advantage." With no federal regulation of the
capital markets and difficulty enforcing substantive rights, another
monitoring device was required to attract capital and bring confidence to
investors.366

The Morgans [father and son-ed.] hated this kind of warfare,
which played havoc with national financial markets and left their clientinvestors holding worthless paper.
Hoping to transform railroad
securities from high-risk speculations into stable, long-term investments,
they and a few other bankers... attempted to discipline the industry.
The fact that railroads continually needed huge infusions of capital put
the bankers in a powerful position.367
Pierpont "saw himself as a proxy for honorable European and
American investors, a tool of transcendent purpose representing the
sound men on Wall Street and in the City. ' 36 8 Pierpont spent much of his
life trying to consolidate railroads, regularize rates, and manage ruinous
competition. 369 Morgan's quest to rationalize and consolidate the trunk
lines was quashed in Northern Securities Co. v. United States.370 The
Sherman Antitrust Act now applied to stock ownership. The Northern
Securities Company, holding the stock of three major transcontinental
railroads, was dissolved!
The Erie Wars were costly; they gave all participants a black eye.
They also helped to fix the rapacious image of robber barons in the
public's eye.

corporate producers was thus increasing, the stock of many large corporations became
publicly held and the ownership was so dispersed that no one stockholder had much of a
say in how the corporation was operated. Id. The result of this phenomenon was that a
class of corporate managers grew up: While they were legally responsible to the
stockholders, that latter body was so numerous that many important corporate decisions
were made by the managers themselves without any thought of obtaining advance
authorization from the stockholders. Id.
366. Substantive enforcement rights were also hard to come by in England. See
Franks, supra note 342, at 12.
367. MORGAN, supra note 344, at 134.
368. RON CHEROW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND
THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCE 30 (Atlantic Monthly Press 1990); see also id. at 44, 45.
369. MORGAN, supra note 344, at 198. The heads of the Wabash, New York Central,

and Erie in 1880 met "'with a view of making permanent running arrangements'-that is,
agreeing to divide up traffic rather than wage war." Id. (The Wabash and Erie were
Gould roads!)
370. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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Norms to the Rescue: The Role of the Gatekeepers. 37' A fair
amount of recent corporate governance literature has dealt with norms
and other non-legal mechanisms of enforcement and regulation. There is
much to be said for their use. An argument can be made that lessons of
the nineteenth century cannot apply to the complex markets of today
because of the size and diversity of the "community." J.P. Morgan and
others could effectively ostracize malfeasors because they were club
mates and prep school chums.
The community was also more
homogenous; the ethics and norms were more accepted and less
susceptible to challenge. I make the analogy to the ethical rules for
lawyers.
The Role of Investment Bankers.372 In such a chaotic legal
environment filled with corruption, investment banks had to create a
system of governance that would assure foreign investors that their
investments would be secure. J. P. Morgan & Co. "pioneered" the
technique of placing a partner of the investment firm on the board of the
corporation. 373 Morgan and other underwriters "first imposed the
discipline of both periodic and inclusive financial reports" while "Wall
Street... required the accountants to certify these reports., 3 74 During
the last two decades of the nineteenth century, virtually every major
United States railroad developed close ties with one or more U.S.
investment banking firms, and the practice of partners from investment
banks and officers of commercial banks going on the railroad's board
became institutionalized.3 75 A major investment banking firm on a
corporation's board "offered mutual advantages both to the minority
investors and to the corporate management by protecting both from the
prospect of a stealth attack by a corporate raider seeking to acquire

371. Portions of this section were adapted from Partnerto Plutocrat,supra note 355,
at 560-68. Norms, informal markets and monitoring appear to have reined in some of the
agency problems in England during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries before the
advent of "modem" securities regulation. See generally Franks, supra note 342.
372. Until the end of the nineteenth century, the London capital markets served more
sophisticated savers. Bankers like Morgan acted as critical intermediaries. See Lance E.
Davis & Robert J. Cull, International Capital Movements, Domestic Capital Markets,
and American Economic Growth, 1820-1914, in THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES, VOL. II., THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 775 (Cambridge
University Press 2000) [hereinafter Davis & Cull].
373. "In 1879 ... when William Vanderbilt asked the younger Morgan to help sell
some securities necessary to get the New York Central through a financial squeeze,
Morgan sold securities in England and obtained the right to select a director, initiating a
pattern that would remake the American economic structure." RoY, supra note 342, at
133; see also The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 29-30.
374. ERIERAiLwAYWARS,supra note 350, at 291.
375. See The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 30.
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control without paying a control premium." 376 J. P. Morgan and other
investment bankers consequently increased the importance of Wall Street
to the world's economy and provided an atmosphere of solidity and
integrity that the markets needed.3 77
A similar transfer of power to the market did not take place in
Europe. In America, one of the practices pioneered on a large scale was
underwriting. Jay Cooke & Company employed standard underwriting
when it used $2 million of its funds to underwrite Pennsylvania Railroad
bonds.378 Cooke bought the bonds from the railroad and then sold them
to the public, guaranteeing the client the funds that it needed. This was
the first underwriting of a commercial company. Its ramifications were
sources of reliable
huge because underwriting guaranteed client firms
379
panics.
by
frightened
investors
funds and assured
In Europe, financial institutions like J.P. Morgan either did not exist
or were too small to underwrite such large equity risks. ° In addition,
they represented far fewer foreign and domestic clients.381 Moreover,
there was no great merger wave as there was in the United States from
1895 to 1903 after the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.382
The Act "prohibited price-fixing and collusion among competitors,
thereby outlawing the cartel-like structure that characterized many
In order to circumvent this prohibition,
American industries. 383
companies engaged in horizontal mergers to create monopolies, which
could better control prices.384 For example, in 1901, J. P. Morgan
orchestrated the merger of eight competing steel companies to form U.S.
Steel, the largest corporation in the world at the time. 385 There was no
similar incentive for British companies to merge in the same fashion,

376. For example, J.P. Morgan in the 1869 "Susquehanna War." See ERIE RAILWAY
WARS, supranote 350, at 31-32.
377.

See THE GREAT GAME, supra note 350, at 153.

378. See GEISST, supra note 351, at 74.
379. Id.
380.

The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 32.

381. See id.
382. Id. at 33; see also Brian R. Cheffins, Investor Sentiment and Antitrust Law as
Determinants of Corporate Ownership Structure: The Great Merger Wave of 1897 to
1903, at 1 (Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 77, 2002)
available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/art77.
383.

The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 33.

384. Id. at 33.
385. See id. It is interesting in retrospect to wonder why the creation of the gigantic
United States Steel Corporation was not challenged under the Sherman Act. Perhaps the
best answer is that this combination occurred before the United States government began
aggressively using its powers under the Act. President Theodore Roosevelt, the "Trust
Buster," sought successfully to dissolve the Northern Securities Company, which held the
stock of three major trunk lines. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197
(1904), was a 5-4 decision that put teeth into the Act.
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especially because British courts were not aggressive in the prohibition
of cartels or price-fixing.38 6
The New York Stock Exchange as Guardian of the Public
Investor. 387 Three important points should be noted about the early
history of the New York Stock Exchange: 1) activism in governance,
such as that of the NYSE, was not the norm for other stock exchanges
around the world;388 2) the NYSE, unlike with debt securities, "did not
possess a de facto monopoly position in trading equity securities as of the
late nineteenth century; '389 and 3) the NYSE's activism "seems directly
attributable to its organizational structure and its competitive
position., 390 Before 1900, "the Boston Stock Exchange was the principal
market for industrial securities," due to the underwriting of New England
textile mills and early railroad corporations.39 1
There were several key differences between the NYSE and the
London Stock Exchange (LSE). The first difference was the ability of
new companies to be listed on the exchange. 392 The NYSE was a closed
system, while the LSE was wide open. 393 For example, "between 1850
and 1905, the membership of the LSE rose from 864 to 5,567. In sharp
contrast, the membership of the NYSE stayed constant between 1879 and
1914 at 1,100."394 A company could only enter the NYSE by buying the

386. See The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 33.
387. Davis and Cull found that investors in companies on the NYSE were buying a
signal of quality. The cartel policies made the listed companies more expensive but also
provided screening, as did the par value rule. See Davis & Cull, supra note 372, at 777,
783.
Another paradox found in this interesting market is the NYSE's use of its monopoly
power that ultimately fosters competitive and diversified markets with a high degree of
transparency. The exclusive "branding" described in this section was good for its
business. Its salutary side effect was that it raised the quality of the market. The London
exchange, as we will see, had the virtue of competition; in practice its standards were
considerably lower.
388. See The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 34.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 36.
393. Id. at 35.
394. Id. at 34-35.
[U]p to the twentieth century the fear of being seen as a monopoly and
provoking intervention, helped to maintain an open policy on admissions to the
London Stock Exchange, along with the interest of the proprietors in increasing
income and discouraging competition. Between 1886 and 1903 a total of 3,854
people applied for membership ... and only 39, or 1 per cent, were rejected.
RANALD C. MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE: A HISTORY 84 (Oxford University
Press 1999) [hereinafter MICHIE, THE LONDON STOCK EXCHANGE]. The New York Stock
Exchange used the cost of membership to maintain its exclusivity. In 1904 it cost just
£120 to be a member of the London exchange; New York seats were available for
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seat of an existing member.395 Unlike the LSE's open system, the closed
system of the NYSE provided several incentives: (1) "the growth of
large, diversified financial services firms (such as J. P. Morgan &
Co.)";3 96 (2) the favoring of self-regulation to protect the value of a
member's seat; 397 and (3) the fragmentation of United States equity
markets into higher 398
and lower quality tiers, which promoted competition
between exchanges.
A second difference between the NYSE and LSE was the
membership rules:
NYSE member firms could raise capital from outsiders-known as
"special partners"-and not all partners in a firm were required to be
members of the exchange. In contrast, the LSE required all partners
in a firm to be members of the exchange and further
prohibited every
399
member from engaging in any other businesses.
The NYSE's rules allowed American firms to grow much larger, with
better capitalization, than their British counterparts (at least five times
larger).4 °0
A third difference was each exchange's position on the issue of
"competitive versus fixed brokerage commissions., 40' Into the late
nineteenth century, the NYSE had fixed commissions, while the LSE
permitted variable commissions.40 2 The NYSE's fixed commission
policy increased the cost of trading and generated lower trading volumes,
driving the lower priced stocks off of the exchange, which gave the
general public the perception that such stocks were lower in quality and
higher in risk.40 3 The policy also forced the NYSE to "limit itself to a
$10,000. See Ranald C. Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges, 18501914, 46 J. ECON. HiST. 174 (1986).
395.

The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 35.

396. Id.
397. Id.
398. See id. The NYSE specialized in top-tier finns (and still does). Therefore, it
vetted the quality of firms for the dispersed investors.
399. Id. On the surface, the LSE seems more attuned with contemporary notions of
"free" markets (more access, lower costs of access, competitive commissions, etc.). This
notion makes perfect sense in the Information Age with the Internet and federal and
exchange disclosure requirements. However, one must remember that the nineteenth
century did not have these tools and markets were susceptible to misinformation by sharp
operators. Therefore, the monitoring performed by investment bankers and the NYSE
was most beneficial.
400.

See The Rise of Dispersed Ownership, supra note 353, at 36-37.

401. Id. at 35.
402. Id.
403. Another consequence of the New York Stock Exchanges' fee schedule was that
companies with higher par were listed on it. Low par value companies such as many
mining and manufacturing concerns were thus excluded. Over time, the NYSE's
deliberate policy of selection and exclusion resulted in the NYSE companies having a
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high-volume, high-quality business" in order to meet minimum
commissions.4 °4 The limitation also came out of fear that "listing highvolatility stocks would invite predictable insolvencies among its
members" (e.g., mining or petroleum companies). °5 Therefore, the
NYSE regularly rejected issuer applications, "either because the issuer
lacked an adequate earnings track record, had insufficient assets, or was
in a high-risk industry. 40 6
Finally, one of the most important developments of the NYSE was
its mandatory disclosure policy for members, even in the absence of any
formal law. In fact, "some financial historians date the advent of modem
financial reporting from 1900, not from 1933, when the federal securities
laws were first adopted., 407 Serious self-regulation may actually have
been inaugurated somewhat earlier following the Erie Wars debacle.
Wall Street realized that without supervision and monitoring, it could
lose its position in the global capital markets.40 8 Its close monitoring
acted as a functional equivalent for future securities regulations,
something not present with the LSE. One of the most important reforms
was proscribing directors from selling their firms short.4 09 Short-selling
by directors and other insiders personified by the likes of Daniel Drew,
the "Speculative Director" of the Erie, destabilized the market and led
reasonable investors to conclude the market was rigged.4 10 Honesty and
such regulation were good for business-a corrupt market drives away
investors who fear losing their investments to fraud, countenanced by
corrupt brokers. An honest market boosts sales and commissions and
leads to increased liquidity and investment. Self-regulation would help
New York to surpass London as the dominant capital market within two
generations.41 '
Consequently, by the end of the nineteenth century, the investment
banking firms, led by J. P. Morgan & Co. and the NYSE, developed
successful methods of monitoring corporate activity and protecting
dispersed shareholders from predatory practices of speculators and Wall
Street insiders.

market capitalization five times greater than those on the LSE. See MICHIE, THE LONDON
STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 394, at 177-85. Quotation on the NYSE gave listed firms
a premium that enabled them to gobble up smaller firms in mergers. Id. at 186.
404. Id. at 36.
405. Id. at 39.
406. The Rise of DispersedOwnership, supra note 353, at 37.
407. Id. at 37.
408. See ERIE RAILWAY WARS, supra note 350, at 212-13.
409. Id. at 278.
410.

Id. at 118.

411.

Id. at 213.
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VII. FILM AND THE DECADE OF GREED
The last two decades of the twentieth century in the United States
were decades of unsurpassed growth and prosperity.412 The stock market
boomed.413 Computers, the Internet, and other technologies drove the
market to dizzying heights. Millions of jobs were created and poverty
levels shrank. Yet, the 1980s have been viewed as the Decade of
Greed.414 In addition, the takeover boom that generated much of the
expansion is seen as busting up much of corporate America with
devastating effects upon the economy.4 15 This article will conclude with
thoughts about how the images from two popular films-Other People's
Money (1991) and Oliver Stone's Wall 16Street (1987)-shaped the
4
perceptions of speculation and Wall Street.
Professor Larry Ribstein in Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View
of Business417 states: "Capitalists in films are villains because they see
businesses as simply fungible sources of monetary gain, not places where
people work, live and create., 418 In his article, Professor Ribstein argues
that "[fjilmakers' portrayal of business is significant because films have
persuasive power that tips the political balance toward business
420
regulation. ' 4 19 Ribstein notes Hitler understood the power of film.
Films are powerful, at least in their traditional theatrical presentation,
because they can create a persuasive illusion on a large screen that
dominates the audience's minds for two hours or more. Unlike
television, the audience must leave home, sit in a darkened theater,
412. Gross domestic product in 1980 was $2.7895 trillion. In 1990, it was $5.8031
trillion. By 2000, it had reached $9.87 trillion. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2004-2005 (124th ed. 2004). Per capita income since
1980 has also increased dramatically. 1980 - $22,666; 1990 - $28,429; 2000 - $34,760
(chained in 2000 dollars). Id. at Abstract # 648.
413. The Dow Jones high in 1980 was 1000.17; in 1990 it was 2999.75. By 2000 it
peaked at 11,722.98. Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1963-2005. THE WORLD ALMANAC

(2007), at 61.
414. See generally BARBARA EHRENREICH, THE WORST YEARS OF OUR LIvES:
IRREERENT NOTES FROM A DECADE OF GREED (Pantheon Books 1990) (labeling the
AND BOOK OF FACTS

1980s "a decade of greed").
415. See generally BRUCE

WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF

AMERICA'S LEADING CORPORATIONS

(Warner Books 1998).

416. For an extensive essay on Wall Street, see Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall
Street, I VA. LAW & BUS. REV. 165 (2006). The essay tracks the bias of the film and
provides an excellent history of the 1980s, including the workings and importance of
arbitrage. See id. at 166-180.
417. Larry E. Ribstein, Wall Street and Vine: Hollywood's View of Business (Illinois
Law and Economics Working Paper Series No. LE05-010, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=563181 [hereinafter Wall Street and Vine].
418. Id. at 9.
419. Id. (see Abstract).
420. Id. at 61.
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and participate in a communal response to the film with the other
strangers in the audience. Unlike with books and home video, the
images reel forward relentlessly, giving the audience little
opportunity to analyze what they are seeing.

More importantly, films generally can alter the political equilibrium
if they consistently express a coherent political position....
[F]ilms
[F]ilmmakers consistently express distrust of capitalists ....
implicitly take the side of those who advocate bringing nonshareholder "stakeholders" into corporate governance and calling on
managers to be more socially responsible. By instilling such
communitarian attitudes in audiences of voters, films lower the
raise those
lobbying costs of stakeholder groups and commensurately
422
of groups favoring shareholder wealth maximization.
Society's apprehension of corporate takeovers and Hollywood's
distaste for the 1980s was vividly seen in Wall Street and Other People's
Money-both highly critical of Barbariansat the Gate.4 23 Both films
focused on the troubling aspects of finance capitalism424 that appeared to
expose weaknesses in American business, culture and ethics.4 25

421.
422.
423.

Id.
Id. at 61-62.
BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF

RJR NABISCO (Harper Perennial 1991) [hereinafter BARBARIANS AT THE GATE].
Barbariansat the Gate is the compelling story of the then-largest corporate takeover in
American history, the $25 billion LBO of an iconic American corporation. It is a must
read for anyone interested in the 1980 takeover battles. Also highly recommended is
CONNIE BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL: THE JUNK-BOND RAIDERS AND THE MAN WHO
STAKED THEM (1988) (the story of takeovers and Michael Milken's success at Drexel
See also JESSE KORNBLUTH, HIGHLY CONFIDANT: THE CRIME AND
Burnham).
PUNISHMENT OF MICHAEL MILKEN (Harper Collins 1992).
424. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Squeezing Truth from Power: The Rise of American
Corporate Capitalism-Prologue(George Washington Univ. Law School Public Law
Research Paper No. 194, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-887362. Mitchell
posits that corporate America underwent a critical shift of governance about 100 years
ago:
[T]he giant modem American corporation was created for financial reasons
during the merger wave of 1897 to 1903, primarily for the sake of promoters'
profits. The consequences of this age of consolidation were profound for the
course of American capitalism. As Thorstein Veblen predicted, it resulted in a
capitalism that privileged finance over business and, indeed, finance at the
expense of business. Since the primary product of the corporation created
during this period was capital stock, not industrial goods, the merger wave
created the modem securities market just as a prosperous middle class with the
means to invest was emerging at the beginning of the Progressive Era. That
class internalized stock trading as a substitute for the land and small
proprietorships underlying the earlier, and now gone, American Jeffersonian
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Let's Go to the Movies....
Other People's Money is the story of the takeover of New England
Wire and Cable, a Rust Belt Industry, by money-hungry Larry "the
Liquidator" Garfield (Danny DeVito).426 Money gives Garfield, a pretty
unlovable cur, "unconditional acceptance. ' ' 27 Garfield makes his money
liquidating "unproductive" companies. His target, New England Wire, is
managed by Jorgenson (Gregory Peck), a decent man who cares for his
town and workers. Garfield's opening overture is abrasive-he tells
Jorgenson that New England Wire " is worth more dead than alive. 42 8
Jorgenson retains his estranged daughter, a top-drawer Wall Street
lawyer, as counsel. She advises that it makes sense to re-incorporate in
Delaware (much more friendly to management). This is good advice.
430
Delaware has Unocal429 and Paramount Commc'ns., Inc. v. Time, Inc.
that, taken together, would have permitted New England Wire to "Just
Say No. ' 43 1 That is, at least until a White Knight appeared. But
Jorgenson's morality will not permit him to consider re-incorporation or
"greenmail"-both of which may have saved the company.4 32
Garfield and New England Wire hunker down for battle, with both
breaking the Standstill Agreement that required them to desist from any
more purchases of stock during the duration of the agreement.
The climactic scene takes place at the shareholders meeting at the
plant and headquarters.4 33 Jorgenson and Garfield have both rallied their
forces. Jorgenson paints a dark picture of Garfield and his minions.
Garfield is: "the entrepreneur of post industrial America, playing God
with other people's money.... He creates nothing, builds nothing, runs
nothing and in his wake leaves nothing but a blizzard of paper to cover
the pain., 434 Garfield will destroy a company that could be used by
America to rebuild its infrastructure.4 35 Jorgenson brings his people to

ideal. Stock became the new property. As such it gradually was pushed to the
forefront of American business life.
Id. (see Abstract).
425.
426.

BARBARIANS AT THE GATE, supra note 423, at 11.
Wall Street and Vine, supra note 417, at 13.

427.
428.
429.
430.

Id.
Id.
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A2d. 946 (Del. 1985).
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).

431. This can result in pyrrhic victories. Time's successful frustration of its
shareholders cost them about $6 billion. See Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary
Duties: On the Need for ShareholderSelf-Help in an Age of FormalisticProceduralism,
46 EMORY L. J. 163, 298-99 (1997).
432. Wall Street and Vine, supra note 417, at 13.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 13-14.
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their feet when he castigates "murder in the name of maximizing
shareholder value, substituting dollar bills where a conscience should
be.... A company is more than money. Here we build, we care about
people. 436
the stage. Garfield likens Jorgenson's speech
Garfield then mounts
437
to a funeral oration:
This company is dead. I didn't kill it; it was dead when I got
here.... This business is dead, let's have the decency to sign the
death certificate and invest in the future. As for the employees, Who
cares? They didn't care about you.... Employee wages went up
way more than stock. Who cares? Me. I'm your only friend. I'm
making you money; that's the only reason you became shareholders.
438
You want to make money, invest somewhere else, create new jobs.
Garfield prevails; New England Wire will be broken up and sold for
more than it was worth as a going concern. But deus ex machina-Kate,
the company's lawyer, salvages the company by proposing an employee
stock option plan ("ESOP"). The employees will buy the corporation,
retool, and make airbags for autos.439
Other People's Money shows corporate America looting its plants
and cheerfully feasting on its carcasses. Little shrift is given to the sound
economics of Garfield's position and the benefits shareholders (and
society) reap from Schumpeter's "creative destruction" and restructuring.
And, the film has a happy ending because Garfield's love for Kate
conquers all and he accedes to the ESOP deal.4 4°
Garfield is sweetness and light to the demonic character of Gordon
Gekko (Michael Douglas) in Wall Street. Gekko is a corporate raider
par excellence. He briskly buys and sells control of companies with no
interest in their operation. He changes management, quickly resells his
prize or breaks it up. He restructures and holds some companies, using a
pool of investors (similar to KKR). Gekko is financed by Wall Streetmoney center banks, insurance companies, pension funds, and other
institutional investors.
Gekko's role as a legitimate speculator is seen in the takeover of
Teldar Paper Company. His corruption and the insider trading that is his
downfall runs throughout all of his major transactions-the plain

436. Id.
437. Id. at 14.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id. This is an "ESOP" Fable. ESOP's have not been wildly successful at saving
struggling businesses.
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implication is that takeover artists are also criminals. 44' The important
question is what the Teldar deal suggested about corporate America.
Gekko initiated his play for Teldar by purchasing enough stock to
block takeovers and obtain access to corporate records.442 Gekko wants
to spring on Teldar and employ an illegal "parking" scheme to acquire
more than five percent of Teldar's shares. Gekko was perhaps using
undisclosed agents to "warehouse" the stock.443
The classic scene in the film is the shareholders meeting where
Gekko rails against the 32 vice presidents and the corporate waste they
represent. He announces that he is the largest stockholder in the
company and proclaims his values in his "Greed is Good" speech.
Gekko touts the same values later espoused by Garfield. The board
counters, asking its shareholders to re-organize the company (probably
putting in a dual-class voting stock to repel takeovers).4 44 Ultimately,
Gekko appears to have bought sufficient stock to have replaced the
board. He is running the company, but not quite so profitably as he once
thought.
Gekko is classically Armani-sleazy. He is ruthless. He manipulates
people. He sleeps around. He destroys companies. He is betrayed by
Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen), his corrupt protdg6. He goes to jail.
Is this corporate America? Certainly the Gekkos did exist in the
likes of Ivan Boesky.445 However, they are not the whole story, and
certainly not the most important part of the story. The great productivity
and unprecedented increase in wealth and prosperity of the last 25 years
could not have occurred if Wall Street were filled with rotters. Films and
popular culture ignore both the performance of markets and the benefits
of trade-producing gains. First, consider a description of how markets
operate:
Moreover, the stock markets, far from the perverse gods of film
fiction, fairly accurately reflect firms' value. The "efficient capital
markets hypothesis" holds that share prices move in relation to
available information about the firms whose shares are trading.
Market prices reflect not only what the firms publicly disclose, but
441.

Id. at 1.

442. See DALE A. OESTERLE, TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR THE LAW OF MERGERS AND
AcQUISITIONS 200 (3d ed., Thomson West 2005).

443. See id. at 201. In warehousing, Gekko wanted to push the price upward to force
the managers to acquiesce to a takeover. If the managers had blocked the deal, the stock
would have slumped and they would have faced shareholder ire.
444. Id.
445. See JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991) (The story of Wall Street
corruption featuring Michael Milken, Ivan Boesky, Martin Siegel, and Dennis Levine.
The heroic lead is played by none other than Ruddy Giuliani, the crusading United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York.).
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also a significant amount of inside information that trading filters into
share prices. Prices also aggregate many educated and uneducated
guesses into a formidable collective wisdom. It follows that takeover
artists like Gordon Gekko or Larry Garfield cannot make money on
the stock they buy unless they can make the company more valuable.
Indeed, speculators perform a service because
their trades assist the
4 46
market in pricing the securities it trades.
That brings us to trade. Modem economies and markets are not a
"zero sum game." Trade and markets produce benefits that are conferred
upon the parties to the deal. Professor Ribstein notes that filmmakers
believe that "[f]irms' commitment to the bottom line of profits therefore
comes at society's cost. ' 44 7 He continues:
This view may have held in the primitive one-on-one pre-capitalist
markets. However, for several reasons the view is inherently
implausible in modem markets. First, no firm can stay in business
without conferring some benefits on those with whom they dealthat is, buyers' or sellers' surplus.448If no one received such benefits,
why would the dealings continue?
Even if markets destroy, liquidation and reorganization recycle capital
and employ it at a more optimal level, benefiting society.449
VIII.CONCLUSION
Speculators often appear to be unsavory, despised characters. They
have been caricatured in political cartoons since at least Tulip Mania.
Popular images have speculators preying on markets, destroying property
and lives. This is a recurrent theme in art, literature and politics.
We have seen that speculators in seventeenth century Holland
financed overseas trade as well as the fantastic tulip market (tulips are
still an import/export of that nation). In the early capital markets of
1720, speculators are reputed to have brought the English economy to its
knees with the collapse of the South Sea Bubble. At the end of the
eighteenth century, in her former colony, speculators were called
bloodsuckers for providing a market for the fallen Revolutionary War
debt-yet this very same debt and their investment in it were to provide
the capital markets that would put the new American nation on a very
sound financial footing.
The specter haunts the Gilded Age in the likes of Gould, Vanderbilt
and others who eventually bound America from coast to coast in ribbons
446.

Wall Street and Vine, supra note 417, at 55-56.

447. Id. at 56.
448. Id.
449.

See id. at 57.
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of steel. The twentieth century closed with the Decade of Greed and the
Dot-Com Boom. Again, speculators were vilified in the press, the halls
of Congress and the arts. Yet speculators engaged in arbitrage, provided
the capital markets with liquidity critical to the stock market boom and
economic prosperity.
Speculators and speculation in markets are
necessary and not necessarily evil.

APPENDIX 1
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The Main Elements of the South Sea Company Conversion
1. The South Sea Company offered to buy all outstanding long
annuities, short annuities and redeemable debts, totaling
approximately £31.5 million in exchange for its own stock.
2. The Company agreed to pay £4 million unconditionally to
the government plus a further conditional sum equivalent to
4.5 year's purchase on all irredeemable debts exchanged by
1 March 1722, together with a penalty equivalent to one
year's purchase (up to £666,000) on all long annuities not
exchanged by then, the maximum sum payable to the
government under all headings being just under £7.6
million.
3. The government would credit the Company with an
increase of £31.5 million both in its nominal capital and in
the amount owed to it by the state if all the subscribable
debts were exchanged. The basis on which debts were
capitalised for this purpose was: 20 years' purchase of long
annuities, 14 years for the short and par value for the
redeemables.
4. The government agreed to pay interest on the increased debt
partly at 5 percent and partly at 4 percent until midsummer
1727 when interest on all debt owed to the Company would
be reduced to 4 percent.
5. The government could start to pay off debts subscribed into
the South Sea Company from midsummer 1727, that is, the
entire debt had become redeemable.
6. The government could lend the Company £1 million in
Exchequer Bills as immediate source of liquidity.45 °

450.

This text describing the scheme is found in DALE, supra note 93, at 102-08.

